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ABSTRACT 
The Security of Computer Accounting Software: 
The Use of Firmware 
September !978 
David R. Callaghan, B.A. State University of New York, 
College at Potsdam, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Dr. Van Court Hare, Jr. 
The last ten years have seen a significant growth 
in computer based fraud. Auditors, as well as computer 
facilities, are now taking great interest in preventing 
this type of malfeasance by instituting new security 
measures and developing new auditing techniques. The 
problem has been that the techniques currently available 
have not been able to prevent this type of fraud. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate 
the possibility of utilizing new semiconductor technology 
for the storage of accounting systems to prevent un¬ 
authorized changes to accounting programs. The methodol¬ 
ogy employed was that of developing a normative model 
based on the new technology. Credence to the feasibility 
of the model was gained by Interviews with persons from 
various backgrounds. 
In Chapter II, the literature relating to computer 
fraud, computer security, and computer auditing was 
reviewed. The problem of computer based fraud was found 
v 
to be much greater than fraud in manual accounting 
systems. While many security techniques have been 
developed to secure computer facilities, they were 
found to be insufficient to prevent a determined pene- 
trator from infiltrating the system. In the area of 
computer auditing, many methods are available to aud¬ 
itors which may assist in the detection of fraud but 
they are not frequently used because they suffer from var¬ 
ious weaknesses and are expensive. 
The new semiconductor technology was reviewed in 
Chapter III to present the reader with the background 
necessary to understand the proposed security technique. 
Special attention was paid to Read-Only-Memories 
(ROM), commonly referred to as firmware, as this was 
the type of semiconductor memory to be used. The pro¬ 
gramming of field-programmable ROM (PROM) was explained 
and the equipment required was reviewed. 
Chapter IV presented the firmware model as a possible 
security method to deter unauthorized changes to the account¬ 
ing software. Programs stored as firmware would require 
physical access to the hardware in order to incorporate 
changes. It was reasoned that since physical access is 
easier to control than software access, greater security 
would be provided to the accounting programs. 
Since the accounting programs would be installed at 
known addresses in the hardware, it was possible to devise 
vi 
a "write-protect” mechanism by which only those programs 
in firmware would be able to access the accounting 
database. This required that the accounting data 
be segregated to its own disk units. The write-protect 
mechanism would allow programs not in firmware to read 
data from the protected units for the purpose of gen¬ 
erating reports but would prevent programs in Random 
Access Memory (RAM) from making any changes to the 
accounting data. 
Also presented in Chapter IV were the changes to 
existing software and hardware that are required by 
firmware model, and the operational procedures by which 
software would be audited and installed as firmware. 
Results of the interviews were presented in Chapter 
V. While many interviewees felt there may be problems, 
especially with respect to the number of changes to 
software, to the interactions between firmware and the 
operating system, and the ability of auditors to detect 
fraud, the overall concensus was that the firmware model 
is feasible. Possible methods to circumvent the 
model were also presented but the probability of these 
techniques being used was determined to be negligible. 
Chapter VI presented the limitations to this 
exploratory study. Recommendations for further research 
were also suggested. 
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CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION 
Hi story 
The electronic computer has undergone some drastic 
changes in its rather short history of approximately 
thirty years: from a giant machine that would fill a 
very large room with 18,000 vacuum tubes to a tiny chip 
of silicon that fits on the end of a finger. While 
physical size was shrinking, execution speeds were becom¬ 
ing many magnitudes faster, with less heat generated, 
using less electricity and with amazing decreases in cost. 
A computer with more capabilities than the first fully 
electronic computer, ENIAC, is presently available at 
local electronics stores for less than $600, with more 
powerful machines predicted for the future. The computer 
industry is truly one of change. 
From the first installations of computers in business, 
the most common application is for automation of the 
accounting system. The reason for this has usually been 
the great labor and cost savings that can be obtained by 
replacing bookkeepers with automated procedures. Tradi¬ 
tionally, this has been done by writing programs that 
emulate the bookkeeper, doing the job faster and with fewer 
errors. Recent trends indicate that the computer is 
capable of much more and as such the accounting system 
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itself is changing. Since the computer is causing changes 
to the traditional accounting system, this dissertation 
will not use the term "computerized accounting" which is 
felt to imply simply transferring manual procedures to 
the computer. Instead, the term "computer accounting" 
will be used which is meant to imply the greater capability 
of the computer to store, transform, and present more 
information than is possible in traditional, manual sys¬ 
tems . 
The ProbIem 
When the accounting system is changed from a manual 
procedure to an automated one, problems develop. In a 
manual system there is constant, almost unconscious check¬ 
ing by the people recording the data. With their constant 
contact with the data, they begin to know it and can 
often detect exceptional transactions that should be 
verified. In computer accounting systems there is no 
thinking component. The machine does not "know" the data 
but only manages the data as per the instructions fed 
into it. Unless the computer is instructed to check 
transactions, such as comparing them to a standard, it will 
not do so -- ever! This means that errors, whether 
intentional or not, once introduced to the system and not 
detected, can be reflected in alI the reports generated by 
the system. 
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A second problem caused by conversion to computer 
accounting methods is the loss of separation of duties 
within the accounting system, traditionally a primary 
method of control. No longer will sales and sales receipts 
be created in one area, billing done by another area, 
and cash receipts collected by still another area. Under 
this type of organization, control is enhanced as one 
group verifies the work of another making fraud difficult 
without collusion between persons in two or more groups. 
Enter the computer and this control is lost. Information 
from sales, billings, receipts and all other areas is 
channeled into the computer with alI records stored in 
one location. A lack of controls programmed into the 
machine or the possibility of turning off those controls 
would effectively eliminate the need for collusion between 
depa rtments . 
These problems have been recognized and controls have 
been instituted to alleviate them. Various controls such 
as vaIidity and reasonableness check can be programmed 
into the computer accounting system to edit the incoming 
data to help insure that only valid transactions are 
entered. They have an advantage over human review in that 
the computer will check all transactionsto insure that 
they conform to specifications whereas the bookkeeper 
may miss errors if tired or bored. However, these pro¬ 
gramed checks also have the disadvantage in that if they 
do not exist in the programmed instructions, the check 
for invalid transactions will never be done. 
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Security for the accounting system rests not only 
with the accounting system programs but also with overall 
computer security. If the programs are not secure from 
unauthorized alteration or if the data for the accounting 
system is accessable by programs other than those of the 
accounting system, then the programmed checks will not 
prevent manipulation and fraud. Various security systems 
have been devised to limit who can use the computer and 
what they can do once they have gained access to it. 
These systems attempt to prevent persons from shutting 
off any of the control mechanisms that may be programmed 
into the system. The problem with these security systems 
is that they are not foolproof. If they can be subverted, 
it is possible for the penetrator to take control of the 
machine and to make any changes he or she wishes to. This 
may include shutting off all controls in the accounting 
system, or more dangerously, only selected controls, and 
then erasing any evidence of the penetration. An ex¬ 
ample of the weaknesses of these types of security sys¬ 
tems is the case of the Multics operating system which 
was designed by M.l.T. and runs on Honeywe I I equipment. 
Multics was designed with security as an uppermost consid¬ 
eration yet the version running on a computer in a 
Honeywell plant in Phoenix, Arizona was penetrated by 
5 
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employees of MITRE Corporation in Bedford, Massachusetts. 
Since the controls currently available are not 
absolute and perfect, additional controls are still need¬ 
ed to secure the accounting system if it is to be stored 
in a computer environment. Computer based fraud is grow¬ 
ing and the magnitude of losses is increasing at an 
3 
alarming rate. As time-sharing systems become more 
widely used, more and more people will have access to 
machines that will simultaneously store the accounting 
system. Not only wi II the accounting data have been cen¬ 
tralized, but there will also be a potential for greater 
numbers of people to access that data. This means that 
there is an increased probability of someone who does not 
fully understand the system doing something they shouldn’t, 
thereby causing damage, or more dangerously, it also 
increases the probability of someone who knows and 
understands the system from penetrating the system and 
causing damage maliciously or for their own benefit. 
Podgus has said, "Timesharing networks, distributed pro¬ 
cessing, and centralized data bases have actually in- 
4 
creased the opportunity for the computer criminal." As 
we move from batch processing where the computer operator 
controls what is done, to time-sharing systems where the 
operator merely monitors the machine, there is a vast loss 
in human control with greater reliance on those controls 
maintained by the machine itself. 
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Firmwa re 
This dissertation proposes a new method of computer 
security which will attempt to gain greater control over 
the accounting system. The method proposed involves the 
use of firmware, a technique by which instructions and/or 
data, commonly referred to as software, can be used to 
store the accounting system programs so they can be in¬ 
stalled physically in the machine (hardware) rather than 
existing as a magnetic pattern on disk or tape. Firmware 
has the unique advantage over other storage mediums of 
being unalterable while it is installed in the hardware. 
This method should act as a greater deterrant for computer 
system penetrators who infiltrate the machine for the 
purpose of making changes to the software since access 
to the hardware will be required in order to make those 
changes. Along with the use of firmware to protect the 
accounting system programs will be a mechanism by which 
the accounting data, stored on disk, will also be pro¬ 
tected. This procedure will involve segregating the disk 
units upon which the accounting data will be stored and use 
of a Mwrite-protect" mechanism which will allow only those 
programs stored in firmware to write or update the in¬ 
formation stored on those segregated units. 
The initial idea for the firmware technique came from 
a dissertation entitled "Computer Security and the Auditor’s 
5 
Responsibility," by Joseph L. Sardinas,Jr. In that diss- 
7 
ertation, the author calls for the use of firmware for 
computer accounting systems and states, "This technology 
6 
could have a major impact upon the accounting profession." 
Further research into the topic found that Sardinas was 
not alone in calling for the use of hardwiring techniques 
7 
but no one was describing how it was to be done. Initial 
research into the production of firmware in 1975 found it 
much too expensive because production techniques at that 
time made firmware costs justifiable only if thousands of 
copies of the same program were to be made. Since 
accounting systems tend to be specialized to the firm, 
or at least to an industry, the production methods at that 
time were not providing the type of product required for 
accounting systems. Price drops in the last two and a 
half years and release of more flexible types of firmware 
have made its use for accounting systems much more feasible. 
This dissertation is the result of in depth research con¬ 
ducted to discover the practicality and feasibility of the 
use of firmware for the purpose of accounting system 
secur i ty 
MethodoIoqy 
The methodology by which this research was conducted 
involved investigation of firmware as to its production, 
cost, and operating properties in order to determine its 
appl icabi I ity to computer accounting systems. Based on 
8 
this research into firmware, a model was developed by 
4 
which firmware could be used to secure accounting pro¬ 
grams from unauthorized changes. Included with this 
model was the production and installation procedures, 
changes to existing software and hardware systems, and 
the effect of the model on the auditor. During devel¬ 
opment of the firmware model it was discovered that con¬ 
trol over the programs alone would not be sufficient 
as other programs could access the accounting data base, 
bypassing the protected programs. As a result, an ex¬ 
tension was made to the model to include protection of the 
data base. This was found to be quite simple because 
the use of firmware would allow the creation of a "write- 
protect" mechanism that would allow those programs in firm 
ware to write and update the accounting data base but 
allow other programs running in other parts of memory 
only to read the data, never to write. This did require 
that the accounting data be segregated to its own disk 
units as not all data will require this level of security. 
From the start it was recognized that it would be 
impossible to build the model physically because of cost 
and time constraints. It was apparent that the model 
would require engineering changes to the hardware that 
might be very costly for an individual as well as being 
beyond the expertise of this researcher. Since actual 
testing of the model was impossible, an alternative 
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method of presenting the model to those people who could 
evaluate it objectively was proposed. While this method 
does not directly test the model, it can build confidence 
in the technique as the model is accepted by critics from 
varying backgrounds. 
The people to whom the model was presented were 
chosen from four areas: computer fraud, computer security, 
computer auditing, and hardware engineering. These four 
areas were used as the proposed method is one which will 
have a direct impact on all of them. The design is a 
security method aimed at preventing certain types of 
computer based fraud. The model proposes that the devel¬ 
opment of the firmware will be the responsibility of the 
auditors and because of its nature, it will affect the way 
in which future audits will be conducted. Since the firm¬ 
ware model also proposes changes to hardware systems, 
engineers must be consulted to insure that the method is 
feasible from that standpoint. 
The presentation of the model to the critics in 
each of the four areas was conducted in the following manner: 
a ten page working paper of the model was developed that 
gave a very broad overview of the proposal. This paper 
was distributed to individuals in each of the four areas 
along with a request to meet with those individuals to 
further discuss the model and to receive any comments and 
criticisms they might have. The meeting requests met with 
JO 
varying degrees of success ranging from no response to 
several hours of discussion. The initial idea was to 
meet with at least one person, and up to a maximum of four 
people, in each of the four areas. Interviews were 
unstructured, open discussions of the model as not to pre¬ 
judice the views of the interviewee. Problems raised 
by the interviewees were evaluated and possible solutions 
were proposed before the next interview. In this re¬ 
cursive manner it was hoped that the model would be 
strengthened by each successive interview. 
The individuals chosen to be interviewed came from 
either the mention of their name in the literature relating 
to their field, or by suggestion from either other inter¬ 
viewees or the dissertation committee. Their professions 
included consultants, educators, journalists, and practi¬ 
tioners in business. Additional fee-dback was obtained 
from graduate students at the University of Massachusetts 
to whom the model was also presented. 
This type of "a priori” or "normative" research is 
sometimes criticized because of its non-experimentaI 
8 
nature and lack of hypothesis testing. Ijiri disagrees 
and replies, "Nelson criticizes a priori research for the 
lack of hypothesis testing, and because of this calls it 
semiresearch. However, I am not sure whether this is a 
necessary characteristic of a priori research. Generally, 
there are two steps involved in prescribing accounting 
1  
alternatives for the future. One is specification of 
goals, and the other is a demonstration that the proposed 
alternative achieves the goal better than other alterna- 
9 
tives." Sterling goes as far as to accept any type of 
accounting research as valid: 
I think that the broadening of accounting research 
questions has been wholly beneficial and that any 
attempt to restrict that scope of questions would 
be detrimentaI . . . Sinee the research methods depend 
upon the questions and since I am unwilling to 
place restrictions on the questions, it follows 
that I am unwi I I ing to place restrictions on 
methods. I conclude, therefore, that all the 
research methods from all of these other disci¬ 
plines are appropriate for accounting. To put 
it another way, the goal of research is to obtain 
results which will contribute to our knowledge. 
The danger of excluding a research method is 
that, in doing so, we will be excluding some 
research results which may contribute to our 
knowledge. To avoid this danger, I am unwilling 
to exclude any research method, and therefore, 
I must include all research methods.*0 
It would appear, therefore, that the type of research con¬ 
ducted here can be very productive, especial ly in the early 
stages of model building. 
When evaluating a normative model, it must be clear 
as to what a normative model proposes. Ijiri classifies 
I I 
models as either "descriptive" or "normative." Descrip¬ 
tive models are representat i ons of real-world phenomena 
as they exist while normative models are descriptions of 
how the real-world ought to exist. 
Since normative models are prescriptive , their dev¬ 
elopment and defense must be different than the hypothesis 
12 
testing of more experimental, descriptive models. Ijiri 
states that the development of a normative model requires 
two steps: setting the goal to be accomplished, and de¬ 
duction of properties of the model based upon those 
I 2 
goals. This means goals must be clearly stated, not 
implied, and this has been done for the firmware model in 
Chapter IV of this dissertation. 
Since normative research does not encompass hypothesis 
testing, its defense must consist of a logical proof of 
its superiority to existing states. Ijiri, again, explains 
While defense for a descriptive model is made 
by verifying the accuracy of representation, a 
defense for a normative model is made by demonstra¬ 
ting that certain benefits are derived if the 
reality is changed to fit the specifications of 
the model, where the benefits are defined in 
relation to the assumed goals. A defense for a 
normative model may be made by logically showing 
the superiority of the state that can be created 
by using the model, or it may be made by demon¬ 
strating this superiority empirically. 
Since goals are concerned with improving 
reality, it must be feasible to apply a model 
to an empirical situation. Thus, the fea sib ? I ity 
of a normative model becomes a vital part of its 
defense. This is in direct contrast to a descrip¬ 
tive model, "H implies E.M Here, E is an actual 
state of the empirical system, and H is its 
generalization. On the other hand, in a norma¬ 
tive model, "G implies F,M F is not necessarily 
an actual state of the empirical system. In 
fact, the purpose of a normative model is to 
demonstrate that F should occur if the goal G 
is to be attained. Thus, while the existance 
of E is an issue in a descriptive model, the 
feasibility of F becomes an issue in the norma¬ 
tive mode I . * 
It is on the basis of these comments that the research 
was conducted in the manner so indicated. The interview 
13 
technique was aimed at establishing the logical complete¬ 
ness of the model, and more importantly, its feasibility. 
The recursive interview/further development cycle provided 
the opportunity to fill in those logical inconsistencies 
identified by the interviewees while the wide breadth of 
the interviewee’s backgrounds provided the basis for 
feasibility acceptance in all the areas affected by the 
model. 
Overview of Remaining Chapters 
The remaining five chapters constitute the body of the 
research conducted. Chapter II is a review of the relevant 
literature in three areas: computer fraud, computer sec¬ 
urity, and computer auditing. The fraud literature provides 
a background of the problem: that of increasing usage 
of the computer for embezzlement and fraud. It presents 
the types of computer frauds that have occurred, who 
perpetrates these crimes, and how much it is costing 
society. In the computer security area, an overview is 
given on the different weaknesses of computer systems and 
some of the techniques used to secure those weaknesses. 
Current and potential auditing techniques that can be used 
to detect computer based fraud is presented in the third 
section of that chapter. What is being done in computer 
auditing is found to be surprisingly less than the 
potential and may be one of the prime reasons for the 
14 
prevalence of certain types of computer based fraud. 
Chapter III is concerned with the current technology 
relating to firmware. Different types of firmware and 
their relationships to each other as well as to other types 
of memory is provided. Production of firmware from 
its blank state to a programmed state is also reviewed. 
The firmware model is presented in Chapter IV. It 
begins with the explanation of the goal of the model 
and proceeds to present the protection of accounting 
programs from unauthorized alteration through the use of 
firmware. The protection of the accounting data base is 
also developed utilizing a segregated storage media with 
a dedicated data channel and a "write-protect" mechanism 
to insure that only the programs in firmware will have 
the capacity to make changes to the accounting data base. 
Chapter IV also contains the procedure by which 
the firmware will be created and installed. The procedure 
presented shows that no great burden will be placed on 
either the auditor or the computer center If the firmware 
model is used. In essence, the procedure shows the firm¬ 
ware model to be highly feasible. Following this Is an 
evaluation of the impact of the model on the auditors 
as they will be the group most affected by implementation 
of the mode I . 
Chapter Visa discussion of the firmware model 
presenting the results of the interviews and some of the 
15 
weaknesses and limitations of the firmware design. 
Chapter VI contains the conclusions drawn from the 
research and points out some of the areas for future 
research in the firmware model. 
16 
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CHAPTER I I 
COMPUTER FRAUD, COMPUTER SECURITY AND COMPUTER AUDITING 
I ntroduction 
This chapter is a review of the literature In three 
areas: computer fraud, computer security and computer 
auditing. These three sections present the problem of 
computer based fraud and techniques in computer security 
and computer auditing that can be used to combat this 
rapidly growing crime. Computer security will not be 
covered In Its entirety as that topic also includes 
security against natural disasters, backup facilities, 
human errors, and the like. The topics reviewed here will 
be those that relate to securing the computer facility 
against unauthorized usage. The same approach will be 
taken with respect to computer auditing. Rather than 
present a large discussion of all auditing methods, only 
those that can assist In the detection of fraud will be 
explained. It Is the problem of computer based fraud 
which Is addressed first. 
Computer Fraud 
The majority of research In this area has been con¬ 
ducted by Donn B. Parker of SRI International, a 
research organization and Dr. Brandt Allen of the University 
I Q 
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of Virginia. Parker's research concerns a topic called 
"computer abuse" which he broadly defines as, "...any 
incident in which a victim suffered or could have suffered 
loss and a perpetrator made or could have made gain and the 
I 
act is associated with computers in some form." This 
definition is rather wide in scope and covers more than just 
computer fraud although fraud constitutes a major compon¬ 
ent of the abuse research. Parker breaks the occurrances 
of computer abuse into four categories: (I) where the 
computer is the obj ect of the act, such as when computers 
are shot with guns; (2) where the computer provides a 
unique environment for the act, as in the theft of computer 
programs (a new type of asset based upon computer tech¬ 
nology); (3) where the computer is the instrument of the 
act, which would include changing programs and data so as 
to institute embezzlement and fraud; and (4) where the 
computer is used as a symbol to intimidate or deceive, as 
when fradulent discrepancies are blamed on "computer 
2 
errors." 
Parker believes that the occurrance of computer abuse 
can be related to one of eight common "functional vulner¬ 
abilities" and he lists them according to the frequency 
of failure as identified in his research: 
(1) poor control over manual handling of input and 
output data 
(2) weak or non-existant physical access controls 
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(3) weak computer and terminal operation procedures 
which allow for the use and sale of computer time and/ 
or sabotage 
(4) weak business ethics 
(5) weak controls over computer programs, allowing 
for unauthorized program changes 
(6) operating system and integrity weaknesses, 
presenting opportunities for system penetration 
(7) poor control over access through impersonation 
to time-sharina services 
3 
(8) weak magnetic tape control. 
Parker’s research is based upon a file of cases 
which he has collected from various sources including 
newspaper and magazine articles, court transcripts, and 
personal interviews with the perpetrators. Based on the 
abuse file, Parker finds an exponential growth in the 
number of cases of computer abuse between the years of 
4 3 
1958 to 1973, and an average loss per case of $4p0,000. 
There is a problem with research based upon known 
cases and Parker recognizes the bias: 
...changing news reporting practices of pub¬ 
licized cases, changing amounts of resources 
available to search for and to record cases, 
changing willingness of victims to publically 
reveal their experiences, or an increasing 
use of computers in environments where white- 
collar crime and malicious mischief is so 
common that it is seldom reported. There 
~ight also be a ’’skyjack” syndrome effect 
causing an actual increased incidence where 
publicity of attractive and exciting types 
of crime encourages more of the same.''" 
Brandt Allen’s research is more limited to the ~opc 
of computer fraud which he defines as: 
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Any defalcation or embezzlement accomplished 
by tampering with computer programs, data 
files, operations, equipment or media, and 
resulting in losses sustained by the organiza¬ 
tion whose computer system was manipulated.^7 
This definition is much narrower than Parker’s definition 
of computer abuse as it excludes theft of computer infor¬ 
mation, use of computer time for personal gain, alteration 
of records for nonfinancial gain, as well as cases of com¬ 
puter sabotage, all of which Parker considers as abuse. 
Allen’s primary concern is in the theft of assets whose 
records are maintained by the computer. He classifies 
computer based frauds as commonly one of five types (in 
decreasing order of occurrence): 
(1) fraudulent disbursements 
(2) sales (billing) fraud 
(3) payroll, pensions, or benefits fraud 
(4) inventory theft 
8 
(5) receivables fraud. 
Examples would include paying fictitious vendors for items 
0 
never received; decreasing the billing amount or failure 
to bill customers for items shipped; printing payroll 
checks for non-existant employees; alteration of computer 
programs to increase inventory shrinkage allowances and 
stealing the difference; and writing off accounts as 
bad debts when no attempt has been made to collect on them. 
Charmichael refers to those frauds which increase accounts 
payable or decrease accounts receivable as "manipuI ative 
22 
as the perpetrators have no direct access to assets but 
instead, manipulate the computer to deliver those assets 
9 
to them. 
Allen has also classified the methods used to manipu¬ 
late the computer, again by decreasing order of occurrance: 
(1) alterations to input data 
(2) program changes 
(3) master file changes 
(4 ) diversion, interception, or misuse of teleproces¬ 
sing. 1 0 
This type of classification scheme is important in 
the control of computer frauds perpetrated by these methods. 
Manipulation of the input data is primarily concerned with 
controls outside of the computer. This would involve 
making sure that only valid transactions are entered into 
the input stream, and that all transactions so entered 
are processed in the computer facility. The control 
method most commonly used here is the traditional separation 
of duties, especially between keypunch operators, com¬ 
puter operators, and programmers. The use of an input/ 
output (I/O) control group can also be very effective in 
the control over col lection of input documents and the dis¬ 
tribution of output documents. This group may also maintain 
control figures which are matched against those calculated 
by the computer and handle any special conditions that may 
arise. The computer can assist in the control of input 
23 
manipulation through calculation of hash and control 
totals and by making validity and reasonableness checks 
but it cannot act as a substitute for the manual controls. 
The remaining three methods of computer fraud can 
be controlled utilizing the computer. Since the computer 
stores the programs and data, it must control who has 
access to that information. This becomes increasingly 
more critical as widespread and increasing use of time¬ 
sharing networks makes it virtually impossible to control 
access to computer terminals. The control by the computer 
becomes one of limiting who can use the terminal, usually 
by a sign-on procedure and then limiting what users can do 
once they have signed-on by utilizing authorization tech¬ 
niques. The sign-on and authorization methods are vir¬ 
tually the only methods available today which can be used 
to protect programs and data stored on the computer. 
Protection of teleprocessing systems can also be 
accomplished using the computer. Various techniques are 
available to encode all data passing between a computer 
and a terminal which can make that data unintelligible 
to anyone except the person who knows the "key" necessary 
to decode it. 
This dissertation Is primarily concerned with methods 
to secure the computer against changes to programs and 
master files and as such will focus with the information 
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in that area. While not the most critical problem, it 
is the opinion of this researcher that adequate controls 
presently exist, but are often not used, to control input 
manipulations. The misuse of teleprocessing systems is 
the smaI lest area of computer fraud and wi I I not be 
directly addressed here. However, certain aspects of 
teleprocessing will be indirectly focused on as many of 
the changes to programs and data can be instituted by 
persons at remote locations and as such must be controlled. 
When looking at statistics on unauthorized program 
changes, there is a wide variation on how much of it 
is actual ly occurring. In one study, 23!? of the computer 
I I 
fraud cases involved program alterations. Parker found 
I 2 
two out of fifteen (13$) in a small in-depth study and 
I 3 
33 out of 375 (9$) in his entire abuse file were cases 
of program alterations. Allen finds similar results with 
I 4 
14 out of 150 cases (9$) falling in the same category. 
I 5 
Allen found this type of fraud to be more common in banks 
but this is likely to be a sampling bias because banks 
are required by law to report alI acts of fraud where 
private corporations are I ikeIy not to report the crime 
because of the possible adverse effect on stock prices 
for the firm. 
The perpetrators of program changes appear to be 
insiders as two studies found alI unauthorized program 
changes were made by Electronic Data Processing (EDP) 
25 
I 6 
employees. This type of fraud is probably easiest for 
insiders to accomplish because of their knowledge of 
testing procedures and controls. Allen has said, "Develop¬ 
ment of fraudulent computer programs is considerably more 
difficult than manipulating input data, not because the 
programming itself is more difficult, but because most 
large companies have controlled testing procedures 
I 7 
for new programs and program changes." This is not an 
absolute statement however, as Allen also provides the 
counterargument: "The one job conspicuously absent from 
the big cases was that of the computer programmer. Perhaps 
these people are not as dangerous as had been feared; but 
it’s also possible that the reverse is true. This is a 
good illustration of the problem of working from detected 
I 8 
cases - we have no way of correcting for sample bias." 
Programming for fraud may be easy provided testing 
controls can be bypassed: 
Proarammed decisions - such as account write- 
offs, inventory scrapping, reordering stock, 
granting credit and paying invoices - can be 
changed. The allowed tolerance between inven¬ 
tory book count and actual count may be in¬ 
creased, and then an amount stolen equal to 
the difference in the two tolerences. A pro¬ 
gram may be modified so that it can be instructed 
to skip specific accounts, as in the case where 
the programmer’s overdrawn account was not re¬ 
ported. A program may be changed so that in¬ 
cremental amounts can be transferred to a 
fictitious account - as in the case of pay¬ 
roll deductions, savings bank interest pay¬ 
ments, mutual fund dividend payments, etc. 
A smaI I amount taken from each of hundreds of 
thousands of accounts can mean a lot of money 
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in total. As Wasserman says, in this type of 
theft, the books always balance.*^ 
Alterations to computer programs by the programmers 
is not the only threat. Penetration of the system by 
illegitimate users can also provide an opportunity for 
fraud. In these cases, the penetrator circumvents the 
computer security controls to access programs or data 
that he or she would not normally have access to. This 
penetration may be by persons who should not have any 
access to the system or it can be by legitimate users who 
undertake unauthorized actions. This penetration may 
be for the purpose of altering programs but is more often 
for the purpose of affecting changes to the data base 
directly. This can be a major method for fraud and 
abuse with one report classifying 45$ of the cases studied 
20 
in this category. This type of penetration is usually 
accomplished by impersonating a valid user on a time¬ 
sharing system and then, once access is gained, circum¬ 
venting programmed controls in order to institute any 
changes desired or to review information that one would 
not normally have access to. Burke pointed out that the 
penetration method can be a very serious threat, "Because 
a clever criminal can erase any trace of his penetration, 
and his subsequent illegal activities, it is possible that 
much high-impact computer-based criminal activity goes 
21 
on undetected." 
27 
Pantages estimates that computer based fraud is growing 
22 
at a rate of 400$ per year. Parker utilized FBI reports 
on bank frauds and embezzlement and found them to increase 
from an average of $7000 per case in the late I960’s 
23 
to $19,000 per case in the 1970’s. These statistics 
were for a I I bank frauds, not just computer related ones. 
When Parker compared these figures with 42 cases of 
computer related fraud in his computer abuse file, the 
24 
average loss jumped to $430,000! Ross has made similar 
estimates of $20,000 per cases in non-computer frauds, 
25 
and $500,000 per case where the computer is used. 
Obviously, utilization of automation can greatly increase 
the amounts that can be taken. 
An example of how frauds can be successfully perpe¬ 
trated is shown by an experiment conducted by Farmer, 
26 
Springer and Strumwasser. While their project was 
involved with frauds instituted in vote-count systems, 
many of the principles they exposed are clearly applicable 
to accounting systems. Their objective was to place 
fraudulent routines in a program that would be declared 
operationally feasible if it could meet four criteria: 
(1) it could pass a ’’logic and accuracy” test using 
test data 
(2) it could be automatically initiated or would 
require minimal operator or programmer action during 
use 
(3) it was not readily identifiable in core dumps or 
load maps 
28 
(4) when detected, it would be attributable to 
several ind i v i dua I s . 27 
They instituted three frauds on the system that were not 
detected by those who knew that the frauds existed and 
were trying to find them: (I) made changes to the operating 
system by adding 65 bytes which requires a bit flag to be 
set by the operator for the fraud routine to work; 
(2) modified the object deck with TXT cards rather than 
REP cards which would have been identified during linkage 
editing; and (3) rigged the count program so that it 
would start the cheating only after the 500th card (the 
28 
test deck used was only 450 cards long). Their con¬ 
clusions contain several weakness of computer systems: 
(1) operating systems are vulnerable to modifications 
(2) program modifications can be done without alter¬ 
ing the length of a program by anyone who has tried 
to save space 
(3) valid "logic and accuracy" tests require sophis¬ 
ticated test decks or prohibitive amounts of time 
(4) many fraud techniques require access by only one 
person, or at most an operator and a programmer 
(5) none of the techniques are detectable by the 
casual observer, even one with an extensive computer 
bac kg roun d. 
Martin believes that the computer actually aids the 
computer criminal : 
While computers close many doors, they open 
others. The potential gain in embezzling a 
computer system is often greater because so 
many records are concentrated together. The 
likelihood of detection is lower if the computer 
controls are bypassed, because the records are 
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hidden away. The modifications made to records 
can be more frequent and more audacious, because 
they will not pass under the eyes of innummerable 
clerks. Auditors are often less likely to find 
the falsification. There will be no fingerprints, 
erasure marks, or missing ledger pages. The 
falsifying program routine can disappear as 
quickly as it appeared. The evidence of what 
happened can be erased simply from tapes and 
disks. There is no need to burn the books. The 
skills required are greater and the detection 
mechanisms more subtle, but the stakes are higher. 
As one errant technition expressed it: "The 
quality of the game has been raised.”30 
Allen also agrees that EDP enhances the opportunities for 
fraud and blames it on seven factors: 
(1) the new computer people that design and run the 
systems have not been taught the importance of control 
in the same manner as have the auditors but are more 
often concerned with the efficiency of the operation 
(2) new data forms do not distinguish important items 
f rom trivial ones 
(3) the centralization of data eliminates the distri¬ 
bution of records throughout the firm and allows a 
penetrator to have access to alI the records needed to 
cover up an illicit act 
(4) there is a lack of human intervention that 
formerly "knew” the data and could detect suspicious 
transact ions 
(5) the computer system concept is difficult to 
understand, even to the trained computer expert 
(6) changes can be made to electronical ly stored data 
without leaving a trace 
(7) audit trails are degraded as source documents 
may never be created as transactions are directly 
entered on CRT’s and as transaction flows are not 
recorded.3' 
It appears that the largest threat comes not from 
outside penetrators however, but from authorized users of 
the system. Barnes says that, "the most important areas 
30 
of possible misuse concern staff engaged in data process- 
32 
ing." Weiss calls personnel "the weakest link in the 
33 
security chain." Van Tassel also fears the potential 
of the computer staff: "Intimately involved with the sys¬ 
tem are three types of personnel: operators, programmers, 
and maintenance engineers. In contrast to the potential out¬ 
side intruder, these three people are much more capable 
of executing undiscovered intrusion simply because they 
are in a position of trust. And it is always trustworthy 
people who commit large embezzlements since only trust- 
34 
worthy people have access to assets." 
Methods are available to assist in the protection of 
computer accounting information. These methods tend to 
be of two major types: (I) methods which attempt to pre¬ 
vent unauthorized access to the computer and its contents; 
and (2) methods which deter illicit activity by raising 
the likelihood of being detected. These two areas can be 
classified as computer security and computer auditing, the 
topics of the next two sections. The methods described 
are found to be infrequently used however, because of 
35 
their cost, in either computer time or money, and 
because they interfere with smooth operations of the com- 
36 
puter center. This does not mean that they don't work, 
just that they are not widely implemented. A good security 
plan requires balance between the cost of security and the 
potential loss of the items being protected. 
Computer Security 
Computer centers contain things of value such as 
data bases, without which many firms could not operate, 
the programs to manipulate those data bases, without 
which the data base may be rendered worthless, as well 
as the physical plant, equipment, and personnel. Since 
these things are valuable, they should be afforded the 
same protection given to assets of equal value. This 
section will review some of the techniques used to 
secure computer centers and computer systems from various 
threats. 
The security systems described here were published 
in various journals. Publishing the methodology of se¬ 
curity systems has been criticized as providing informa¬ 
tion to potential intruders, that the techniques used 
37 
should only be explained on a "need to know" basis. 
38 
Baran and Peters do not agree, however. Peters, of 
the National Security Administration (NSA), has said, 
"If you are not willing to completely describe your secur 
ity system. It is not secure. The security system gains 
Its strength from its logical completeness, from its 
comprehensive study of what it is to protect and how it 
39 
Is protecting it." On this basis, it will be assumed 
that the systems described here are the most secure avaiI 
able today. 
32 
When discussing the security issue it becomes diffi¬ 
cult to separate security from privacy as privacy is 
dependent on adequate security. Barnes defines privacy 
as ’’the right for a person to question the right of a 
third party to hold data personal or private to them and 
to dictate terms under which that third party can hold 
40 
or use their personal data,” and security as ’’the means 
or methodology which is used to protect data, equipment 
and buildings or personnel from risks which may damage, 
misuse or betray the confidence of the predetermined 
4 I 
method of operation.” IBM has coined another term 
called ’’data security” which they define as ’’the protec¬ 
tion of data from accidental or intentional disclosure 
to unauthorized persons and from ' unauthorized modifica- 
42 
tions.” This last definition shows the close relation 
between privacy and security as the ’’accidental or inten¬ 
tional disclosure to unauthorized persons” is a privacy 
issue if the data is concerned with an individual, or a 
security issue if the data is classified material in fie 
government. The ’’unauthorized modification” part of the 
definition is mostly a security issue, as in the case of 
fraud, but could also involve privacy problems if the 
changes were to the detriment of an individual. It be¬ 
comes clear therefore, that it is difficult to make a clear 
distinction between the two topics. Ball presents the rela- 
33 
tionship between the two areas as in Figure 2-1 but 
he leaves the size of each area and the extent of the 
43 
overlap open to further research. It is likely 
that the overlap is dependent on the types of information 
stored at different computer facilities. 
In the literature, many of the descriptions of sec¬ 
urity systems pertain to security for privacy rather than 
for the purpose of preventing fraud and embezzlement. This 
does not mean that the mechanisms described are not accept¬ 
able for fraud protection, however. Both issues are trying 
to prevent unauthorized access to information stored on a 
computer system. The issue of security for privacy may 
be more stringent than that of security against fraud as 
the privacy issue requires that persons should not have 
any access to information for which they are not authorized, 
whether for alteration purposes or simply to read. This 
Figure 2-I : Security—Privacy Relationship 
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may not be as much of a concern in accounting systems as 
the accounting data may not require such strong control 
over read capabilities. In an accounting data base the 
big problem is unauthorized alteration to the data and/or 
associated programs for the purpose of fraud and embezzle¬ 
ment. However, if the data collected for accounting pur¬ 
poses does involve the privacy issue, as in savings account 
balances at a bank, then it may be true that the accounting 
system security overlaps privacy problems to a much greater 
extent. 
In the early stages of computer usage, security was 
not a difficult process. All jobs were run in a batch 
mode, under the control of the computer operator. Only one 
job at a time was run and only those magnetic tapes necess¬ 
ary for the running job were mounted on tape drives. Sec¬ 
urity under these conditions was one of merely limiting 
physical access to the computer room and hiring trust¬ 
worthy employees. 
With the advent of more powerful and cost effective 
hardware and software in the I960?s care the use of tire- 
shared, mu 11i-access, mu 11iprogrammed systems. This brought 
about several new security problems: (I) many users with 
various access rights concurrently using the system from 
remote locations; (2) multiple programs with different 
access rights co-resident in memory; and (3) multiple 
files of different sensitivities simultaneously stored 
35 
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in a readily accessible state. These problems were 
quickly recognized and in 1967 a session at the Spring 
Joint Computer Conference was devoted to the new topic 
of computer security. At that session Ware identified many 
of the potential threats of time-sharing systems and his 
45 
diagram of threats is presented in Figure 2-2. Also 
at that session, a paper presented by Petersen and Turn 
classified the threats against information privacy as 
being either accidental disclosure or deliberate dis- 
46 
closure. Accidental disclosures of information are 
caused by hardware failures and use of partially 
debugged programs which allow persons to view information 
they were not intended to see. Deliberate disclosure 
occurs when the person receiving the information actively 
attempts to obtain it. 
Petersen and Turn break the deliberate disclosure class¬ 
ification down further into passive and active components. 
In passive infiltration, the receiver of the information 
does not attempt to manipulate the system in order to ob¬ 
tain the information desired, but simply monitors infor¬ 
mation as it is moved throughout the system by legitimate 
users. This is accomplished by placing wiretaps on communi¬ 
cation lines or through pick-up of electromagnetic radiation, 
fears also identified by Ware in Figure 2-2. A more 
serious threat to accounting systems is that of the 
active infiltrator. In this situation, the infiltrator 
36 
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actively attempts to gather the information he desires 
by interacting with the system. There are many ways 
in which an infiltrator can become an active participant. 
He may: use his legitimate access to ask unauthorized 
questions or to "browse” in unauthorized files; "mas¬ 
querade" as a legitimate user after obtaining proper 
authorization codes by wiretapping, searching through 
waste baskets, etc.; "between the lines" entry 
where the infiltrator uses a commmunication line attached 
to the system by a legitimate user who is inactive at the 
time; use "piggy-back" entry which involves tapping a 
communications line and selectively intercepting 
messages between a legitimate user and the processor and 
releasing them with modifications or entirely new messages 
while correctly responding to the legitimate user; or use 
"trap door" entries, where the penetrator utilizes inten¬ 
tional or unknown design flaws in the system to get to a 
47 
more privileged state. The ease with which many 
of these active infiltration techniques can be accomplished 
is readily testifiable by persons working with data centers. 
A very common problem is the security of authorization 
codes. Many users find it difficult to remember the often 
strange sequences and therefore write the procedure down. 
This written record can often be found lying on tables, 
in waste baskets, and even taped to the side of terminals. 
This provides enough information for the active infil¬ 
trator to "masquerade" as a legitimate user. 
38 
While the privacy issue has been clearly identified 
48 
as being important to the accounting profession, the 
biggest threat with respect to computer based fraud 
is that of the active infiltrator. He is the only 
one who has the capability to affect change upon the 
system by virtue of the fact that he is the only one inter¬ 
acting with it. The other types of infiltration do not 
give the penetrator the opportunity to make those 
changes. Since fraud accomplished through changes to 
programs or master files requires alteration to the 
system, the auditor concerned with these problems should 
be primarily interested with the active participant. 
There are several ways that protection strategies 
can be classified. Petersen and Turn present five differ¬ 
ent security techniques: (I) preventing access to computer 
usage through "access management"; (2) preventing unauthor¬ 
ized access to information once signed on through "pro¬ 
cessing restrictions"; (3) maintaining a record of all 
actions in the machine and review of this log, referred 
to as "threat monitoring"; (4) using "privacy transfor¬ 
mations" to scramble the information to make it unintell¬ 
igible except to those with the "key"; and (5) "integrity 
management," to assure that the hardware, software, and per- 
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sonnel are doing their jobs in a correct manner. A 
summary of how these countermeasures can deter threats 
to information is presented in Table 2-1. An important 
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factor fo note is that threat monitoring is a post 
facto technique that is primarily used to discover illicit 
systems usage after the damage has been done. As a de- 
terrant it can only act as a threat of detection, rather 
than actively attempting to thwart the penetrator. This 
is essentially the same problem as with auditing in the 
yearly audit. It can only detect fraud after it has al¬ 
ready happened. More on the auditing problem will be 
presented in the next section. 
Weissman 's classification scheme for protection 
strategies is only slightly different than that of 
Petersen and Turn. He uses the following strata: (I) 
isolate and control access, comparable to Petersen and 
Turn’s access management and processing restriction 
categories; (2) confound through cryptography, the same 
as "privacy transformations;" but Wasserman also goes 
on to include: (3) deter by making the profit/loss and 
gain/risk factors low for the intruder; (4) wager through 
purchase of insurance; and (5) delegate, by shifting 
the protection responsibility to someone else, as in util- 
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ization of a service bureau. 
Each of the strategies proposed is presently being 
used in some form against the different types of system 
penetration. In attempting to stop passive inf i 11rators, 
the most common method is the use of cryptography. This 
method can scramble messages sent over communication lines 
and in order to unscramble it, the receiver must know 
the "key" by which it was encoded. The key is not the 
method by which the data is scrambled, but a string of 
characters that is "added" to the plain text data to 
form the encrypted message. Skatrud has explained two 
methods of cryptography through digital substitution 
5T 
and digital route transposition. Girdansky presented 
Lucifer, a device which can be attached to terminals to do 
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the cryptographic encoding and decoding. The use 
of cryptography for this purpose has become so popular 
that the National Bureau of Standards has adopted a stan- 
53 
dard encryption algorithm originally developed at IBM. 
There has been considerable controversy over this method. 
While IBM and NBS claim that it would take a computer years 
of work to decipher an encrypted message if the key was 
54 
unknown, others claim it can be done in only 3 to 4 hours. 
Regardless of the controversy, encryption can be a very 
effective means to secure data on communication Iines for 
all but the most sensitive of data. 
A great amount of attention has been given to the 
fear of radiated signals, the frequent example given is 
that of a truck parked outside a government computer 
center that was printing the same thing which was being 
printed inside the center just by picking up the radiated 
signals. However, this case has been identified as a 
55 
This type of infiltration is the least likely of hoax. 
42 
all as the equipment necessary to pick up the radiated 
signals is extremely costly and it is very difficult to 
separate the many signals being radiated. If this truly 
was a problem, the solution would cost as much as the 
radiation pick up equipment. The solution involves the 
construction of a Faraday Cage, a grounded wire mesh, 
around the computer center which prevents radiated signals 
from being transmitted outside of the computer room. 
Radiation pick up from communication lines can be easily 
control led by use of cryptography as one would do for 
deterring wiretapping. In general, the fear of rad¬ 
iation pick up is unnecessary. 
Preventing illicit activity by active infiltrators 
is a much more complex issue as the active infiltrator 
may be a valid user of the system who is trying to take 
unauthorized actions. There are several levels of control 
here: (I) preventing access to hardware; (2) preventing 
use of the system; and (3) limiting access to information 
once access to the system is gained. In the early days 
of batch-only computing, access to the hardware was rather 
simple as alI of the equipment was kept in one room. 
Control was as easy as control of who entered the computer 
center. The same situation is sf i I I true for the main¬ 
frame and major peripherals, but with the advent of time¬ 
sharing and remote job entry (RJE), control over alI 
systems hardware is not so easi ly accompl ished. Term- 
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inals and RJE stations are often under no supervision 
allowing for unlimited access. An even bigger problem 
arises if the system allows dial-up service. In this 
situation, there can be no control over system terminals 
as the infiltrator may provide his own. The infiltrator 
must only discover the telephone number for the system, 
frequently a very easy thing to do. 
It has been said that control over access to the 
hardware in the computer center is "simple, cheap and 
56 
efficient." Vast experience has been gained over 
numbers of years of protecting a given physical location. 
Some of the latest technology includes key locks, badge 
locks, double door "man traps", television monitor 
systems, and a multitude of alarm systems. Some of the more 
elaborate devices read finger and palm prints or analyze 
57 
voice prints under computer control. Chapters in books. 
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issues in periodicals, and booklets have been written 
on physical security control methods. Great care must be 
taken when evaluating these control tools as their prices 
and effectiveness vary greatly. Considerable attention 
must be paid to the cost/effectiveness of any given combi¬ 
nation of devices, especial ly with some of the more elab¬ 
orate ones . 
Assuming that access to time-sharing terminals and 
RJE stations is not difficult for the active penetrator, 
two more levels of control remain. The next level of 
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protection is to prevent use of the equipment unless 
authorized, usually accomplished through a "sign-on" or 
"log-in" procedure in which the terminal, the user, or 
both are identified. Terminal identification can be 
accomplished by its polling address in an dedicated net¬ 
work, or through unchangeable identification codes built 
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into the terminal. Identification of the user is usually 
by one or more of the following: (I) something he knows, 
such as a password; (2) something he carries, such as a 
badge or key; or (3) physical characteristics, such as 
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voice or finger prints. The computer checks the iden¬ 
tification received against list of valid terminals and/or 
users and wi I I grant use of the system provided a match 
is found. If no match is found, the user is usually given 
a few more tries, allowing for communication errors, after 
which the computer will disconnect the terminal. This 
disconnect feature is used to prevent random guessing of 
passwords in hopes of discovering a valid one. 
The identification scheme most commonly used is a 
user number and password system although badge systems are 
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available. The problem with password systems, as pre¬ 
viously noted, is that user numbers are usually easy to 
obtain. If an infiltrator can discover someone else’s 
identification sequence, he will be able to do anything 
which the authorized user would be allowed to do. A 
second difficulty with these systems is that the table of 
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all user identifications must be stored on the machine for 
verification upon sign-on. This may allow a successful 
system penetrator to list all the identification 
information, giving him access at any privilege level. 
To prevent this, a method has been devised by which user 
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identifications are stored in a one-way encrypted form. 
Each time the user signs-on, the identification typed in 
is encrypted and compared to the encrypted version stored 
on the machine. Since the encryption is one-way, there 
is no way to decipher it to discover the original text. 
Several other problems which occur with password usage have 
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been presented by Wood. 
Badge systems utilize credit card technology and 
often contain a magnetically encoded stripe that can 
be read by special equipment attached to the terminal. 
The cards are difficult to duplicate but suffer from the 
additional expense for card reading equipment and the 
chance of lost cards. The lost card problem is not too 
severe as the person losing the card is more apt to 
discover the loss than if a password were stolen. 
If the user is successful in the sign-on procedure, 
the last layer of protection is invoked. This layer is 
probably the most critical as it is meant to control 
authorized users of the system as welI as the unauthorized 
infiltrator. The objective at this stage is to limit access 
to only that information for which the user is authorized. 
Friedman describes six levels of protection at this point 
(1) The user is prevented from using the sys¬ 
tem if he is unauthorized to access any data 
in the system. Thus, if he is granted entry 
into the system, he can access a I I the data 
in the system. 
(2) The user is permitted to use the system 
(log on) but is prevented from requesting 
access to an unauthorized item by the virtue 
that he does not know its name or is unaware 
of its existence. 
(3) The user is permitted to use the system 
(log on) and to request access to data files. 
If the user does not possess the appropriate 
privilege, then access is denied. 
(4) Data-dependent protection can be provided 
by testing for privilege violations just 
before the information is transmitted to the 
user. Permission to receive data is granted 
on the basis of the data. 
(5) As an alternative to denying access or 
preventing transmission of information to 
the user, requested data could always be 
made available in a cryptographicaI Iy 
enciphered form, such that the correct 
information cguld be deciphered only if the 
user has the right key. 
(6) The last method is a combination of 
the previous methods, in addition to the 
use of elementary cryptography which dis¬ 
courages the practice of "browsing" through 
another user’s files.^5 
There is virtually no security provided by the first 
two levels. Protection really begins when the authoriza¬ 
tion for access is provided. It is also at this higher 
level that the problems begin in the design of the 
security system. 
There are several approaches to the authorization 
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problem. One technique is to create a table, sometimes 
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called a ’’security matrix,” where the rows correspond 
to the items to be controlled and the columns correspond 
to the objects to be protected such as terminals, files, 
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records, etc. At the intersection of the row and col¬ 
umn is the decision rule for access, such as prohibited, 
read only, create, modify, etc. Each time a controlled 
item attempts to access a protected item, the authorization 
table is referenced to verify the legitimacy of the request. 
This technique has some major difficulties in actual 
implementation because as the number of rows and columns 
becomes large, it becomes increasingly more difficult to 
handle. A second problem is that the decision rules, other 
than prohibiting access, are sparse and much of the space 
in the matrix is repetitive. Conway, Maxwell and Morgan 
suggest that practicality can be gained by: (I) lumping 
users into classes with identical authorization; (2) by 
making the decision rule a binary yes/no; and (3) by 
careful analysis of when and how the matrix should be 
68 
interrogated. 
A second approach, known as the ’’rings of protection”, 
69 
was proposed by Graham. In this technique, an item is 
associated with one of a set of concentric rings as shown 
in Figure 2-3. An item associated at an inner ring is 
allowed to access items on outer rings but is prohibited 
from those items on rings closer to the center. This 
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technique has been implemented in the Multics operating 
system designed at MIT which runs on Honeywell’s 6080 
70 
computers. Multics was designed with five principles in 
mind: (I) base protection mechanisms on permission rather 
than exclusion; (2) check every access to every object 
for current authority; (3) the design will not be secret; 
(4) implement the principle of "least privilege;" and 
(5) the human interface must be designed for naturalness, 
7 I 
ease of use, and simplicity. 
Multics is rather unique in that it incorporates the 
72 
ring structure in the hardware. In addition, its permis¬ 
sion structure is implemented utilizing an access permis- 
73 
sion I 1st for each control led segment. In this manner. 
Figure 2-3: Graham’s Rings of Protection 
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an owner of a segment can permit individuals or groups of 
users to access the protected segment by simply adding their 
name or category to this permission list. If a user’s 
name or category does not appear in the permission list, 
regardless of ring numbers, access will be denied. This 
mechanism provides for protection by permission rather 
than by exclusion. 
Strangely enough, the entire Multics system relies 
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on identification of users through a password scheme. 
Each time a user signs-on to the system, Multics prints 
the day and time of the last log-in to aid the users in 
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identification of possible "masquerading." Users are 
given the opportunity to change their passwords at any 
time and alI passwords are stored in the machine in one- 
76 
way encrypted form. 
Friedman also indicated that cryptography could be 
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used to secure information in a computer system. This 
would involve similar techniques to those used to secure 
communication lines from wiretapping. In this situation, 
the information would be stored in encrypted form which 
would make it unintelligible to anyone but those who 
knew the key. Sequential data files can be encrypted just 
the same as data transmission as the data will be read 
in the same order in which it is created. Random access 
files are more difficult as the data will not be read in 
the same order in which it was created. Anderson has 
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proposed a method by which random access records can be 
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encoded based upon their relative positions in a file. 
Programs can also be encrypted much the same as sequen¬ 
tial files but they must be decoded prior to execution, 
There is an inherent problem with all security systems 
based in operating system software: if the security con¬ 
trols can be circumvented, everything stored on the machine 
becomes vulnerable. Turn has said, "The effectiveness of 
all programmed techniques depends upon the intrusion- 
resistance of the operating system. It is likely, there¬ 
fore, that capture of the operating system will be the 
principle goal of any intruder - after this, all resources 
will be at his command. At present, there are no opera¬ 
ting systems that are intrusion-proof . It is also likely 
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that no such system can be designed in the near future." 
This rather bleak picture has been reiterated by numerous 
80 
authors, as lately as 1977. 
Lientz and Weiss point out what can be done once the 
operating systems has been "broken": "At this point the 
penetrator disables or diverts the computer accounting 
system such that the activity (i.e. audit trail) of the 
system is blurred. Now the penetrator can initiate 
unauthorized transactions, alter programs and systems 
logic, destroy information, obtain or view highly sensi¬ 
tive information or can accomplish all that is possible 
81 
by his or her own creativity." 
A method which can be used to test the intrusion- 
resistance of the operating system and security routines 
is that of penetration teams, sometimes referred to as 
82 
"tiger teams." Popeck explains, "Essentially, workers 
searched for exploitable design and implementation errors 
by any intuitive, ad hoc, or personally systematic means 
they perfer...ln general, these teams are so disturbingly 
successful that no system is known to have withstood such 
83 
efforts." 
It was just such a penetration team, called ZARF, 
which was able to penetrate the Multics system at a 
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Honeywell plant in Phoenix, Arizona. ZARF is a joint 
project between the U.S. Air Force and MITRE Corporation 
that is concerned with computer security. The most 
interesting facet of this case is not that Multics was 
designed with security as an uppermost consideration, but 
that the penetration was initiated at MITRE headquarters 
in Bedford, Massachusetts, 2000 miles away! 
Attempts are being made to improve the security of 
these systems. One approach is to place all security 
software in a "security kernal" which could then be 
85 
proven through mathematical techniques to be correct. 
This may be very difficult to do however, as the interac¬ 
tions and anomalies in such a large piece of software as 
the operating system, may prove to be overwhelming. 
Since existing security systems are not secure, a 
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heavy burden is placed on auditors to insure that the 
computer accounting system is not compromised. This 
means that advanced EDP auditing techniques are required 
to test the system and it is these techniques which are 
addressed next. 
Computer Auditing 
In the beginning, the use of computer systems in 
business for the automation of accounting systems caused 
no major difficulty for the auditor. McRae, in an early 
text on computer auditing, said, "one tends to forget 
that the computer leaves a great deal of auditing, 
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especially external auditing, unaffected." At the time 
this may have been very true as the computerized system 
was simply an automated version of the manual one. 
Transactions were keypunched up from source documents and 
the auditors could physically see them. It was rather 
easy to trace a transaction through an edit run then to 
an update run which affected the files. Since different 
programs affected different files it was possible to 
trace each transaction from its input document to its output 
result. 
Enter time-sharing systems with integrated files and 
data base techniques, and major changes to the audit of 
a computer accounting system must occur. Source documents 
may no longer be created as transactions are directly 
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entered on cathode ray tubes (CRTs). In addition, a 
single transaction may affect more than one file, having 
a ripling effect throughout the system. Oneof the more 
interesting new types of transactions are those that are 
generated by the system without any source transaction 
input. These transactions arise because of things like 
the end of the month, and are programmed directly into 
the system. 
It is not surprising therefore, to find many new methods 
proposed for the audit of computer accounting systems. 
The specific methods are numerous and have been well 
87 
evaluated elsewhere. Since this dissertation is con¬ 
cerned with the prevention of computer based fraud, this 
section will concern itself primarily with those methods 
which may assist in fraud detection. 
Auditors claim that their audit techniques are not 
aimed at detecting fraud, although fraud may be detected 
by them. In the Statement on Auditing Standards No. I 
(SAS I), the following statement appears: 
In making the ordinary examination, the inde¬ 
pendent auditor is aware of the possibility that 
fraud may exist. Financial statements may be 
misstated as the result of defalcations and 
similar irreguI arities, or deliberate misrepre¬ 
sentation by management, or both. The auditor 
recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently material, 
may affect this opinion on the financial state¬ 
ments, and his examination, made in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards, 
gives consideration to this possibility. How¬ 
ever, the ordinary examination directed to the 
expression of an opinion on financial statements 
54 
is not primarily or specifically designed, and 
cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations 
and other similar irregularities, although their 
discovery may result...The responsibility of the 
independent auditor for failure to detect fraud 
(which responsibility differs as to clients and 
others) arises only when such failure clearly 
results from failure to comply with generally 
accepted auditing standards. 
This section of SAS I was supersceded in January of 1977 
with the release of SAS 16, but the new release still 
maintained that detection of irreguI arities is not the 
responsibility of the auditor provided he follows generally 
89 
accepted auditing procedures. Perhaps one of the major 
reasons for the release of SAS 16 was the court suits that 
arose when the auditors failed to detect a material fraud. 
An example of this was a case involving Ernst & Ernst 
as auditors of First Securities Co., an Illinois brokerage 
90 
house. A suit by investors in First Security held the 
auditors responsible for negligence. In trial court the 
ruling was in favor of Ernst & Ernst but this was over- 
9 I 
turned upon appeal . The case was final ly resolved in 
the Supreme Court in 1976 with a ruling that the accountants 
were not liable as the negligence occurred during an 
audit conducted in good faith and no misrepresentation 
92 
was intended. While this appears to have settled the 
issue for the time being, the massive amount of computer 
based fraud that has been occuring recently may encourage 
Congress to step in and force the auditor to accept 
93 
the responsibility of fraud detection. 
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The lack of ability by auditors to detect fraud is 
no minor problem. Allen found that auditors detect less 
94 
than 50$ of the known computer frauds and then goes on 
to say, "This and other accidental discoveries of embezzle¬ 
ment schemes leads one to believe that there is a great 
95 
deal of embezzlement that goes undetected." A major 
reason for this may be that auditors will look for fraud 
only after they have happened: accounts receivable and 
inventories were verified only after the McKesson and 
Robbins fraud in 1939; and inventories in public ware- 
96 
houses were checked only after the salad oil swindle. * 
The likelihood that this trend will reverse with respect 
to computer auditing is bleak at best: "The ability of 
most organizations to generate application programs of 
increasing complexity is outstripping the audit abilities 
of both internal and external auditors. To date, there 
is no reason to believe that the auditors will never catch 
97 
up." 
While the future of auditing for computer fraud is 
not promising, this does not mean that the topic should 
be ignored as it appears the accounting profession would 
98 
like to do. If accountants are to serve their clients 
and the investing public, they must make an effort 
to detect frauds because the magnitude of computer based 
99 
fraud is 25 times that of a non-computer fraud. 
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A breakdown of computer abuse presented by Parker 
may assist the auditor in determining how to audit for 
computer fraud. Parker classifies computer abuse as 
I 00 
either being "inspec" or "nonspec." Inspec cases are 
ones in which the computer is used within specifications 
but the input data is manipulated; the most common type 
101 
of fraud identified by Allen. Nonspec cases are those 
in which the computer is utilized in an unauthorized 
manner, for example making unauthorized changes to programs 
or the data base. There is a difference in the people 
who perpetrate these types of crimes which may be of 
assistance in their detection. Nonspec cases are per¬ 
petrated by those who have the knowledge and skills in com¬ 
puter technology necessary to manipulate the machine, 
while inspec perpetrators do not need this technical 
I 02 
know-how, although they may possess it. Parker goes on 
to indicate how this classification technique affects the 
auditor: 
This typology of compuer abuse is important to 
auditors in indicating, the skills and knowledge 
they must possess and the types of controls and 
safeguards they must deal with. Dealing with 
inspec threats requires a minimum of technical 
knowledge of computers. The problem is primarily 
one of manual handling of data and concern with 
the controls that are built into the application 
programs in order to detect deviations from 
normal activities and from normal ranges of 
values in input and output data. The integ¬ 
rity of the computer system and of its use can 
be assumed. On the other hand, auditors dealing 
with nonspec threats must have an in-depth 
technical understanding of computers because the 
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integrity of the computer system has been threat¬ 
ened and attacked. The auditor must deal with 
the problem of correctness of computer programs 
and data files within the computer.'^ 
The techniques available to the auditor which may aid 
in the discovery of fraud can also be classified according 
to the i nspec/nonspec typology. Since inspec cases 
involve input manipulations, techniques such as question- 
a i res and generalized audit software packages can be very 
useful. The use of questionaires and verification of respon¬ 
ses is a widely used method for evaluating internal control. 
It is important that verification take place as answers 
to questions may be provided on the basis of "that’s 
what the auditor wanted to hear" rather than indicating 
what is truly practiced. Special attention should be 
given to the separation of duties within the computer 
center and to the handling of input and output documents. 
Many fine examples of questionaires for this purpose have 
been developed which help to point out the specific con- 
I 04 
troIs to look for. 
Another technique for discovering inspec problems 
involves the use of generalized audit software packages. 
These programs allow the auditor to access the accounting 
data base, independent of the client’s programs, in order 
to analyze the data stored there. These packages not 
only allow the auditor to select accounts for confirmations 
according to selection criteria, but also allow for cross- 
58 
footing and complete checking of all calculations, an 
I 05 
impossibility by hand. Van Tassel suggests an interest¬ 
ing audit program which will compare names on the payroll 
at the end of the period with those at the beginning of the 
period and will print out a list of all names not appearing 
I 06 
on both. This can be used to point out those names in 
need of verification of hiring and termination authoriza¬ 
tion with the personnel department. 
Auditing for nonspec violations is considerably more 
difficult. In this type of audit, the auditor must verify 
that the procedures programmed into the computer are pro¬ 
per and that the accounting data base represents actual 
transactions. This would include verification of appli¬ 
cations programs, the operating system, the security 
system, utility programs and compliers, as well as the 
data base itself. 
One of the oldest and most common methods for testing 
software is the use of test data. In this situation, data 
for which results are known, is run through the program 
to be tested and the results are compared. A problem 
with this technique is development of the test data. 
Baird says that test data created by the programmers is 
not desirable as it is biased toward specific properties 
of the program and may not take in the many possible 
I 07 
combinations and interactions. Brown suggests parti¬ 
cipation by user departments as their experience with the 
I 08 
data can assist in the production of unique cases. 
Since the auditor wishes to maintain independence, the 
best approach is probably use of a test data generator. 
This software product will randomly generate transactions 
according to specific input parameters. This allows the 
auditor to maintain his own test data, independent of 
the client. 
There is another technique which can be used in 
conjunction with test data called ’’automatic tracing and 
mapping. it In this technique, a software product can 
’’shadow” a program against which the test data is being 
run. The automatic tracing and mapping routines print 
out results of execution time or execution counts for 
different segments or lines of a program. This technique 
can be used to assist in the production of further test 
data by pointing out sections of a program that were 
untested and then creating test data to exercise those 
I 09 
sections. Several products are currently available 
for this purpose: McDonnell Douglas Astonautics has a 
Program Testing Translator which provides execution time 
statistics and frequency counts for program statements 
I I 0 
written in FORTRAN and Applied Data Research provides 
a product cal led MetaCobol which has as part of its speci 
I I I 
fications , the ab i 1 ity to shadow COBOL p rog rams. 
There are two major problems with the use of lest 
data to insure the propriety of software. First, it is 
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not possible for the auditor to insure that the program 
I I 2 
tested is the one actually used in production. Mul¬ 
tiple versions of a program can be stored simultaneously 
and a switch between the production version and the tested 
version is easily accomplished. Secondly, as demonstrated 
in the experiment by Farmer, Springer and Strumwasser, 
the program can be written with trap doors that do not open 
until a specified number of transactions have passed 
I I 3 
through. If the number of test transactions is less 
than the amount specified in the program, the fraudulent 
code will not be detected by test data alone. The use of 
a tracing and mapping product will alleviate this problem 
however, as the fraudulent code will show up as not having 
been executed. 
A technique similar to test decking is the Inter- 
I I 4 
active Test Faciltiy (ITF) first proposed by Wasserman. 
In this situation, the auditor would have his own terminal 
attached to the working system. Through this terminal he 
could create fictitious vendors, customers, employees, etc. 
and would also create fictitious transactions that would 
affect the accounts created. This is essentially the 
same as test decking but with a major advantage, the 
auditor is working on the live system and can therefore be 
assured that no substitution of programs has occurred. 
The ITF technique suffers from some major flaws 
however. Since transactions entered by the auditor are 
fictitious and actually affect the working data base, 
they must be backed out of the system before any reports 
are made. If this isn’t d'one, the reports generated would 
reflect those fictitious transactions. This can be very 
difficult especially in cases where the system allows on¬ 
line inquiry of the data base. Another problem is that 
in testing only against selected, fictitious accounts, 
the auditor may miss fraudulent routines that look for 
specific, valid accounts. With randomly generated test 
decks there is at least chance that a fraudulent account 
may have a transaction created for it. A third problem 
is that since all auditor created transactions must be 
backed out of the system before reports are generated, 
the fictitious transactions must be identified to the 
system in some fashion. If fraudulent routines were 
designed to detect this identification, they could man¬ 
ipulate the ITF transactions in a proper manner while 
handling all others fraudulently. 
Another auditing technique involves the use of soft¬ 
ware packages which can compare two programs in either 
source code (high level language) or object code (machine 
language) and highlight any differences between the two. 
Provided that the auditor has a copy of the program under 
his control, he can compare it with the client’s program 
and concentrate the audit on those sections of code which 
are different. This assumes that the auditor is satisfied 
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with the propriety of the program under his control. The 
source code/object code compare technique has some weak¬ 
nesses however. As in the case of test decks, it is 
virtually impossible for the auditor to insure that the 
client's program is the one normally used for production 
purposes. Secondly, by concentrating on the differences* 
the auditor may overlook interactions between the new code 
and the previously existing code. 
A controversia I technique for detecting fraudulent 
routines in programs is software review, where the auditor 
reads the code to determine if fraudulent routines exist. 
Sandler said, "Review of complex computer programs is 
I I 5 
unproductive and generally impractical." Dial and 
Goldberg agree that the discovery of deliberate, unauthorized 
statements is slight and point out three reasons why: (I) 
unauthorized statements may be buried in hundreds of lines 
of code; (2) such statements cannot be recognized by the 
layman or by the auditor who is untrained in EDP; and (3) 
run copies of programs are stored in a compiled state 
I I 6 
which does not look at all like the source program. 
The literature is not unanimous in its condemnation 
of software review however. As mentioned, this technique 
tends to be controversia I . Several noted authors have 
I I 7 
indicated that software review may be clearly justified. 
Wooldridge, Corder and Johnson said: 
63 
Compiled programs can be reviewed by someone 
outside of the data processing section. The 
review should cover not only conformance to 
specification, but also inspection of the 
coding to eliminate the possibility of unauthor¬ 
ized routines being present. This means that 
the reviewer must be not only a responsible, 
fairly senior person but also that he must be 
experienced in the programming language used. 
Obviously the expense and time involved will 
not be justified for all systems. Some 
companies may find that they have few, if any, 
sensitive enough to require such scrutiny. 
But it is the only way to be absolutely posi¬ 
tive that all the programs are "clean” at the 
time the system becomes operational.*'® 
The important thing noted here is that they make a dis¬ 
tinction between programs that justify code review and 
those that don’t. For the auditor concerned with computer 
accounting software, this would mean review of only those 
programs which create or update data items in the data 
base and ignoring review of those programs which produce 
reports based upon the accounting data. 
A technique to aid in software review has been 
developed in conjunction with a new programming style 
I I 9 
called "structured programming." In short, structured 
programming involves extensive use of subroutines, each 
designed to perform a specific task, which are linked 
together in a hierarchical structure to perform a larger 
task. Since the subroutines are short, they can be more 
fully tested. The software review technique involved 
with structured programming, cal led "structured walk¬ 
throughs," consists of creating a committee of four to 
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six persons, none of them management, who go through the 
code together with the programmer to determine the correct¬ 
ness of the logic. This technique has been advocated by 
I 20 
IBM as an integral part of structured programming. 
It should be easy to include someone from the audit staff 
as a member of such a committee who could present the 
audit viewpoint on the software. 
The methods just mentioned for auditing for nonspec 
frauds are primarily concerned with fraudulent routines 
in programs. Nonspec cases also arise from unauthorized 
changes directly to the data base, most commonly accomp¬ 
lished by unauthorized programs. This case is harder 
to audit for as the auditor is simply not aware which pro¬ 
grams, out of thousands run on the machine, may access 
the accounting data. In this situation, the auditor must 
place a g re a t degree of reliance on the security system 
to limit access to those files. As mentioned previously 
in the section on computer security, these systems may 
leave a great deal to be desired. The testing of the sec¬ 
urity system in some fashion should be part of a normal 
audit, the most extensive test being the use of a "tiger 
team." Sardinas calls this the "systems approach strat- 
egem" and shows how an auditor could use it in subverting 
I 21 
a Point-of-Sale (POS) application. Weissman presents 
a "flaw hypothesis methodology" which attempts to 
determine the flaws in the system in order to find paths 
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for penetration. The difficulty with this approach is 
that the technique is complicated and expensive and can 
I 23 
rarely be afforded. 
The only other direct way to audit for data base 
accesses is through review of the systems log. This tech¬ 
nique may not be very effective as the number of accesses 
to a given data base may be too large to analyze effec¬ 
tively, and as previously noted, a successful penetra¬ 
tion may have erased any record of the access anyway. 
An indirect technique for auditing this type of 
nonspec fraud is the use of generalized audit software 
packages. Since the illicit programs will affect records 
on the data base, auditing the data base as one would do 
for input manipulations may be successful. 
With the techniques just described, the auditor has 
some very powerful tools with which to audit EDP systems. 
It is surprising therefore, to find that most of these 
techniques are not used in the course of a normal audit. 
Sardinas found in his research of foI lowing auditors on 
EDP audits, that EDP auditing is usually done in two 
stages: (I) use of a generalized audit software package 
to scan appropriate files, generate confirmations, and pro¬ 
duce selected totals; and (2) completion of an EDP internal 
I 24 
control questionaire. This is very disheartening as 
the potential is so much greater. 
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With the obvious reluctance of auditors to insti¬ 
tute some of these more powerful EDP audit techniques, it 
might appear that new techniques for security and auditing 
would be similarly received. It is felt that this will 
not be the case given the new methods provide a higher 
level of security and do not suffer from many of the draw¬ 
backs of current auditing techniques. 
The following chapters provide a security method 
which attempts to give a higher level of security 
against nonspec threats. The use of firmware to protect 
programs from unauthorized alterations will provide a 
security never possible with a magnetic storage medium. 
The techniques used to audit firmware are essentially 
those presented in this chapter but they are strengthen¬ 
ed by the fact that the programs audited can be assured 
to be the same ones used in production. In addition, a 
mechanism is proposed by which only the audited programs 
in firmware are able to make changes to the accounting 
data base, thereby eliminating the fear of pirate programs 
accessing the data base directly. 
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CHAPTER 
FIRMWAR E 
1ntroduction 
When electronic computers were first introduced in 
the late I 9 4 0 ’ s , their instructions were often given by 
hard-wiring a board. This was found to be very inflexible 
and difficult, so the use of software was introduced. 
Software, which is defined as, "A computer program for 
I 
execution from read/write random access memory,” offered 
greater flexibility as it was much easier to change holes 
punched in cards which were then read by the machine than 
it was to change the wiring. Software storage has come 
a long way since then, going from Hollerith cards to 
magnetic tape to magnetic drums and disks. Each 
advancement in software storage has made changes easier 
and faster and while this may be desirable in most cir¬ 
cumstances, there may be times when changes should be more 
difficult. 
Recent advances in the last ten years have brought 
forth numerous products based upon semiconductor technology. 
This new technology has presented new types of storage media 
for computers, one of which is firmware. Firmware can be 
defined as, ”A computer program for execution from read 
2 
only memory (ROM) or programmed read only memory (PROM)." 
Firmware can be very useful as it is flexible and easy to 
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use since it is based upon programs written as software. 
But firmware also has an advantage for use in those applica¬ 
tions where changes are not required or should be more 
difficult because the firmware can be installed physically 
in the hardware and cannot be as easily changed as soft¬ 
ware. In fact, the term firmware is derived from the 
notion that it is a combination of software and hardware, 
being neither one, but something in between. 
This chapter will explain the many types of firmware 
and how firmware relates to more common storage media. 
Special attention will be given to programmable read only 
memory (PROM) and erasabIe-programmabIe read only memory 
(EPROM) as these types of firmware will be used in the 
security methods proposed in Chapter IV. How programs 
are placed in firmware and the devices necessary will also 
be explained. 
Semiconductor Memory Types 
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to get 
down to individual circuit elements and how they can be 
combined to form a computer. An entire issue of Scientific 
American was devoted to microeIectronics and explains the 
3 
details very well. The actual workings of different 
memory types wi I I simply be assumed here but the character¬ 
istics will be explained. 
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Computer devices which store data have many different 
characteristics such as how long the data can be stored, 
the speed with which it can be accessed, whether the 
storage media moves, and many more. These characteristics 
have technical terms which will now be explained as an aid 
in evaluating the many types of storage media. 
Permanent vs. Non-permanent. Memory which is said to be 
permanent has the characteristic of not being easily 
altered once it is loaded with the data to be stored. It 
may be replaced however. Non-permanent memory can be 
easily changed by erasing the previously stored data and 
then placing the new data over the erased area. 
Volatile vs. Non-volatile. If the memory media is un¬ 
reliable in retaining the data in the absence of power, 
it is said to be volatile. If the media can store 
data without a constant electrical supply, it is non- 
voI ati Ie . 
Dynamic vs. Stat ? c . These terms can actual ly have two 
meanings. In the case of volatile memory systems, dynamic 
refers to the need for constant refreshing of the data 
stored else the data will slowly fade away, while static 
implies that the data need only be written once and will 
remain stable as long as power is applied. In the second 
case of non-volatile magnetically stored data, dynamic 
means that medium and its supporting structure are moved 
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physically in order to produce a signal while static means 
that the magnetic element may move but its supporting 
structure does not. 
NDRO vs PRO. Non-Destructive Read Out (NDRO) occurs to 
magnetic storage media when the data can be read from 
the media without affecting the storage location’s contents. 
Destructive Read Out (DRO) is also a characteristic of 
magnetic storage media and occurs when data must be 
rewritten to the media after reading in order for the 
storage location’s contents to remain unchanged. 
Bipolar vs MOSFET. These two terms describe two methods 
of creating semiconductor transistors, the building block 
of new computer memories. Bipolar transistors consists of 
three elements called the base, the emitter and the collec¬ 
tor, formed in several layers on a chip of silicon. 
MOSFET, which stands for Meta I-Oxide-Semiconductor Field 
Effect Transistor, also consists of three elements, re- . 
ferred to as the source, the gate, and the drain, and is 
also formed on a chip of silicon. While similar in some 
respects, the differences in the way they work, their fab- 
brication, cost, and speed, make memories based on the two 
technologies very different. Bipolar tends to be faster 
but MOS is cheaper and can provide more densely packed 
transistors on the silicon chip. 
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With the technical characteristics defined, it is 
now possible to describe some of the new memory types 
in terms of these characterist i cs . It is assumed that 
the reader is familiar with such long standing computer 
memories such as core, disk, and tape. The descriptions 
here will be on the new types of memory coming from the 
implementation of semiconductor technology. 
Random Access Memory (RAM) This semiconductor memory is 
replacing core as the central memory of the computer. 
Any given location can be directly accessed either for the 
purpose of reading the data stored there or writing new 
data into the locations. Semiconductor RAM may be static 
or may require refresh (dynamic) and is available in both 
Bipolar and MOS technologies. The use of more expensive 
Bipolar RAM can often be justified when fast access times 
are required. 
Read Only Memory (ROM). This memory type actually describes 
a family of non-volatile memories which may be accessed 
randomly, like RAM, but only for purpose of reading the 
information. The placing of the data and/or instructions 
?n ROM can occur either when the ROM is produced or it may 
be programmed later. The acronym ROM most often applies 
to the permanent type which is programmed at the fabrication 
plant using a photolithographic mask, also referred to as 
Mask Programmed ROM (MPROM). The programmable types are 
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most often distinguished by a prefix to the acronym. 
Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM). These type of 
permanent memories describe subfamilies of ROMs which are 
field programmable by the user. When purchased from the 
fabrication plant the memory locations are all set to a 
constant value (one or zero) which can be changed using a 
device cal led a PROM programmer. The use of the acronym 
PROM usually refers to a permanent memory type built of 
bipolar nichrome fuse-links which are "blown" to change 
bit values from the initial state to the opposite state as 
required. These fuses, once blown, cannot be repaired 
and so fuse-link PROMs cannot be changed back to the 
initial state. Other types of PROMs can be erased and 
reprogrammed, and as such are not permanent, but again, an¬ 
other prefix is used to describe these erasable types. 
Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM). This 
type of PROM is non-permanent in that it can be erased 
back to the initial state, and the PROM can be reprogrammed. 
While the acronym EPROM describes two types of erasable 
PROMs, it is usual ly meant to stand for those which are 
erasable using ultra-violet light. For this reason 
they are sometimes referred to as UVEPROM. 
Electrically Alterable Programmable Read Only Memory (EAPROM). 
This is the other type of EPROM but is distinguished from 
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the ultra-violet type in that it is erased electrically. 
It is sometimes referred to as Electrically Erasable 
PROM (EEPROM) or Electrically Alterable ROM (EAROM) 
to clearly distinguish it from the ultra-violet type. 
The relationships of these Read Only Memory types 
to each other can be shown as in Figure 3-1 which demon¬ 
strates the family nature of ROMs. Figure 3-2 presents a 
much wider relationship, giving all of the different types 
of memories that have been available, are presently avail¬ 
able, or are about to become available. Figure 3-2 
is different from Figure 3-1 in that it breaks memory types 
down according to characteristics rather than logical 
families. It can be seen in Figure 3-2 that semiconductor 
memories are dispersed in many major categories with ROM 
and PROM being permanent types, EEPROM and UVEPROM (note: 
Type setting error shows it as OVEPROM) as non-permanent. 
Read Only Memory (ROM) 
i-1———-1 
Mask (ROM) Field Programmable (PROM) 
,-1-1 
Fuse-Link (PROM) Erasable (EPROM) 
i-“*”■—:—t 
Ultra-Violet Erasable Electrically Alter¬ 
able (EAPROM, EEPROM, 
EAROM) 
Figure 3-I: Read Only Memory Family Relationship 
MEMORIES 
DEVICE 
Figure 3-2 Computer Memory Relationships 
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With the relationships of semiconductor memories 
established, the operating characteristics will now be 
shown to demonstrate their applicability to computer sys¬ 
tems. Table 3-1 presents several of the operating 
characteristics as obtained from data sheets provided by 
semiconductor manufacturers and advertisements in recent 
electronics magazines. It should be clear that the 
different characteristics make these memory types applicable for 
differing applications. 
RAM is important as a replacement for core memory 
as it has the same random access, read/write characteristics 
but is cheaper and requires less cooling. Its volatility 
however, keeps it from being used as a long term storage 
media. For more permanent storage, other possibilities 
exist. 
The Read Only Memory (ROM) family of semiconductor 
memories can be very useful for storage of information 
which will not change or will do so infrequently as its 
nonvoI at i I ity encourages it use as a long term storage 
media. Masked Programmed ROM is useful only when large 
quantities of a given program are to be made because the 
mask costs are so high. They are most commonly used in 
mass produced items such as T.V. games, washing machines, 
gas pumps and many other products, where production quan¬ 
tities exceed 10,000 units. A problem with masked ROM 
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Is that If an error is made In the program when the mask is 
produced, a new mask must be made to correct the error, 
which means the $10,000 mask charges are incurred again 
for the correction. 
When the desirable properties of ROM are required but 
less than 10,000 units will be produced, PROM is used. 
The use of PROM avoids the mask cost of ROM but incurs 
the difficulty of programming the individual chips using 
a PROM programmer. However, since PROM is a permanent 
memory, like masked ROM, if an error is found In the program 
after the PROM has been "burned,” a reprogramming cost is 
Incurred because the PROMs with the errors must be dis¬ 
carded. Unlike masked ROM, additional mask costs are 
not incurred when errors have been made, only the cost of 
replacing the chips. 
If changes to programs stored in PROM are likely to 
be frequent, it is wiser to use EPROMs rather than fuse- 
link PROMs. If changes are required, no cost is involved 
in replacing the chips, only the cost of time spent to 
erase and reprogram them. For this reason, EPROMs are 
frequently used in the development of products which will 
use firmware and once the correctness of the program has 
been established, masked ROM or fuse-link PROM will be 
used because of their lower per-unit cost. 
EAPR0M is presently not being widely used because 
it is too expensive, too slow, and Is unreliable. Its 
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advantage of being erasable while still installed in the 
machine does not overcome the drawbacks and as a result, 
EPROMs are used despite their erasing inconvenience. 
It should be clear that each memory type has its ad¬ 
vantages and disadvantages. The choice of which type 
of memory to use becomes most difficult with respect to the 
different types of Read Only Memory and is dependent on 
how many copies will be made and how often chanqes occur: 
masked ROM for many copies (greater than 10,000) and no 
changes, fuse-link PROM for fewer copies (1-10,000) but 
with no changes, or EPROM for programs with few copies 
(1-10,000) and with the possibility of frequent chanqes. 
For firmware which will be unique or have only a 
few copies, the technology used in EPROM production is 
the most popular. Not many firms make fuse-link PROMs 
and even fewer make EAPROMs. The reasons for this are 
many. Since EPROM technology is proven and firms have 
had wide experience with it, firms are more likely 
to look to EPROMs than to the other two technologies. The 
problems of EAPROMs previously mentioned keep it from being 
an active competitor. Fuse-link PROMs also have draw¬ 
backs in that the burned out fuses have a tendency to 
grow back causing them to be unrel iable over long periods. 
In fact, some non-erasable PROMs are not based on fuse- 
I ink technology at al I but are simply EPROMs without the 
window which allows the ultra-violet liqht to pass through 
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to erase the memory. 
While EPROMs are becoming more popular, certain types 
of EPROMs are quickly becoming industry standards. While 
there are many types of EPROMs In different sizes and 
different pin configurations, the 2708 and 2716 chips are 
by far the most popular, especially those based on a 
design by Intel Corporation which only require a single 
+5 volt power supply. The 2708 has 8K (8192) bits 
for IK of 8 bit bytes. The 2716 has I6K bits for 2K bytes 
of storage. These two products are the most popular 
EPROMs in the Spring of 1978 but are likely to be replaced 
by larger EPROMs as they become available. 
In February 1978 Intel announced the release of 
2732 EPROM (32K bit - 4K byte) which would permit a 65K 
byte program to be stored on only 16 chips. Texas In¬ 
struments has released a similar product, designated the 
TMS 2532. 
Hammer has predicted the growth in storage capacities 
of semiconductor memories to be as follows: 
Year Bits per 
1970 300 
1 975 1 5 K 
1 980* 500 K 
1985* 20M 
1 990* 800M 
^Projected estimates 
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With the recent advances in the number of bits per 
EPROM chip, it would not be unreasonable to expect a 
2764 to be released soon. It would appear that the capacity 
of EPROMs is surely to grow in the future making it cheaper 
and easier to store programs in firmware. 
Up to this point it has been assumed that Read Only 
Memories can be programmed to store information as 
firmware. The method by which the firmware is produced 
is dependent on the type of ROM used and it is to the 
description of programming ROM we now turn. 
Programming Read Only Memory 
As previously indicated, there are essentially four 
types of Read Only Memory: Mask Programmed ROM, Fuse- 
Link PROM, Ultra-Violet EPROM, and EAPROM. The ways each 
of these types of firmware are initially programmed is 
different. In this section the programming methods and 
the devices and software necessary to program ROM will 
be described. 
Masked ROMs. ROMs which are to be programmed at the fab¬ 
rication plant using a mask reguire that a copy of the 
program to be stored as firmware be sent to the manu¬ 
facturer. This listing of the machine language code is 
most often listed on paper tape or punched cards according 
to a format specified by the ROM manufacturer. From this 
listing, with the aid of a computer, the manufacturer lays 
out the final mask for the fabrication process. This 
final mask is the one which actually programs the binary I’s 
and 0’s which will represent the program. Several weeks, 
and sometimes months, later, the batch of finished ROMs 
will be delivered. This long lead time until delivery can 
be a critical consideration between use of a masked ROM 
or user programmed PROM. 
Fuse-Lin k Proms. Fuse-Link PROMs are fieId-programmabIe by 
the user with the aid of a PROM programmer. The type 
of PROM used is important not only in the design of the 
computer circuitry, as each PROM may have a different pin 
configuration, but it is also important in the way the 
PROM will be programmed. Depending upon the manufacturer, 
the PROM may contain all I’s or alI 0’s when it is de¬ 
livered. Signetics, a semiconductor manufacturer, 
initializes their PROMs at 0 while Raytheon initializes 
theirs at I. This becomes important as to program a fuse- 
link PROM, the fuses representing each bit of a program will 
be "blown out" if the bit value desired is opposite of 
the initial state. If the bit value is to be the same 
as the initial value, the fuse is left untouched. This 
means that programming time is dependent on the number of 
bits to be blown. 
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Blowing a nichrome fuse-link on a PROM is as easy 
as selecting the address of the 8 bit byte to be programmed 
and then presenting a high voltage (17 volt) to the 
output pin of the bits which are to be blown, one pin at 
a time. This 17 volt signal is usually repeated 10 times at 
each bit location to insure that the fuse-link is suff¬ 
iciently blown to avoid regrowth of the fuse. 
Ultra-Violet EPROMs. In programming UVEPROMs, the initial 
state of the chip is not as important as it is with 
fuse-link PROMs. The reason for this is that the chip 
will be programmed a byte at a time, presenting all 8 bit 
values, regardless if they are I’s or 0fs. EPROMs are 
designed to be unaffected at bit locations where the 
desired bit value conforms with the initial state. Only 
those bit locations where the opposite value is desired 
will be changed. 
The common procedure is to select the address of the 
byte to be programmed, and present the byte value to the 
output pins where the data would normal ly be found during 
a read operation. Once the address is selected and the 
value is presented to the output pins, a programming 
pulse, usually +26 volts, is sent to a programming pin on 
the chip. The next address is then selected, presented 
with a value and pulsed, and so on through all addresses 
on the chip. This process is repeated through alI chip 
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addresses from 100 to 500 times to insure that the pro¬ 
gramming is sufficient to be reliable. The programming 
time is variable depending on the chip to be programmed. 
For example, it takes 100 seconds to fully program an Intel 
5 
2716 and up to 8 minutes for a Texas Instruments 2708. 
It is suggested that the EPROMs go through the erase 
peocedure, which will be explained later, before 
programming to insure that the initial state is achieved. 
After programming, the programmed chips are usually com¬ 
pared to the copy they were produced from to insure that 
the programming procedure was successful. 
EAPROMs. Like EPROMs, EAPROMs should be erased before 
programming. This is done by applying a voltage to an 
erase pin on the chip which may erase the whole chip at 
once or only one byte at a time. Programming is very 
simlar to that for ultra-violet EPROMs as to selecting 
addresses, presenting the byte value to the output pins, 
and pulsing the programming pin but EAPROMs only have to 
be pulsed once per byte, uni ike the 100 to 500 times for 
EPROMs. This means they may be programmed much faster 
with times running between 2 to NO seconds depending 
on the number of bytes programmed. 
Programming Devices. The devices used to program user- 
programmable ROMs are simple and can be built using a 
couple hundred do I lars worth of electronic components. 
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These devices, commonly referred to as "PROM Programmers," 
can be purchased from commercial vendors who build high 
quality, reliable products. Two vendors which exemplify 
the types of products available are Cromemco and Pro-Log. 
The Cromemco product, called the Bytesaver, is for use 
in microcomputers which utilize the SI 00 bus arch i tecture. 
While not for general use because of this limitation, the 
Bytesaver has many desirable features. It can program up 
to 8 of the popular 2704 and 2708 EPROMs at a time. This 
means it can burn a program which is 8K bytes (8 chips 
@ IK bytes each) without the need to stop to remove 
programmed chips and install erased chips for burning 
a long program. The board on which the programming 
is done has its own power source for the programming 
pulse in addition to the 8 sockets. When programming is 
complete, the chips can be removed from the Bytesaver 
board and placed on a blank memory board or the Bytesaver 
board itself can be used for this purpose. This latter 
alternative is not desirable as it ties up all the 
programming electronics which are not necessary on a 
memory board . 
The advantages to the Bytesaver are its inexpensive 
cost ($300) and its ability to program up to 8K at once. 
Its disadvantages include its dependence on the SI 00 Bus 
architecture and its ability to program only the 2704 and 
2708 chips. 
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Another product produced by Pro-Loq Corporation over¬ 
comes many of the difficulties encountered with Bytesaver 
but is considerably more expensive. The Series 90 PROM 
Programmers from Pro-Log are much more flexible as they use 
"personality modules" which allows the programming of 
nearly all PROM and EPROM chips presently available. It also 
has options for gang programming (making several copies 
of the same chip alI at once) and also for the use of an 
RS-232 interface. The RS-232 is a standard by which 
computer equipment from different manufacturers can be hook¬ 
ed together for the purpose of communication. This 
means thatthe Pro-Log product can be connected to most 
any computer built today. 
The main disadvantages to the Pro-Log product is the 
amount of PROM which can be programmed at one time, and 
the cost. The personality modules allow programming of 
only one chip at a time, meaning with today’s largest EPROM 
chip at 4K Bytes, that a much smaIler amount can be 
programmed in one step than is possible with the Cromemco 
product. In addition, the Series 90 is very expensive, 
costing $1800 for the basic unit, $300 for the RS-232 
interface option, and personality modules ranging from 
$350 to $900 each. However, this product comes in a brief 
case form, is of industrial quality and is more flexible. 
It is the opinion of this researcher that the PRO 1 
programmer of the future wi I I be a combination of features 
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available today. It will be flexible like the Pro-Log 
Series 90 but will allow programming of 65K or more, over 
multiple chips, in one programming pass. This will be 
more in line for use with large mainframes and large pro¬ 
grams. This device of the future will probably make use 
of a microprocessor to handle the various sizes of programs, 
the different chips, and so on. 
Programming Software. The software which controls the sig¬ 
nals in a PROM Programmer is very simple. The program for 
burning a 2708 EPROM takes less than 300 bytes of machine 
language code in the Bytesaver, and less than 100 Bytes 
6 
with other devices. The programming software tends to 
be specialized for each different type of PROM because 
timing seguences are critical to successful programming 
but on software this short, the alterations should not be 
too difficult to change for different chips. 
Erasing EPROMs. EPROMs erasable by ultra-violet light are 
not fully enclosed in plastic cases as are other semi¬ 
conductor memories, but have a window on the top which 
allows light to strike the silicon surface. Ultra-violet 
light can temporarily make silicon a conductor which 
allows the electrical charge, which represents a 0 or I 
bit, to dissipate. The wavelength used for erasing all 
EPROMs in 2537 Angstroms which can cause ful I erasure in 
anywhere from 15 to 60 minutes. The amount of time is de- 
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pendent upon the wattage of the UV Iight source and how far 
the light is from the EPROM. The UV light most often sugg¬ 
ested by semiconductor manufacturers is the Model S-52 
made by Ultra-Violet Products, Inc. of San Gabriel, 
7 
Cal i fornia. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted! to explain some of the ad¬ 
vances in computer memory systems through the use of 
semiconductor technology. Comparisons were made between 
the many types with special attention paid to Read Only 
Memories (ROM). ROM, also called firmware because it is 
a way software can be stored in hardware, can be programmed 
either at the fabrication plant or in the field by the 
user. The programming of user-programmabIe PROMs has been 
explained and the devices necessary were also presented. 
In the next chapter, the technology explained here 
will be used as a method to secure software against 
unauthorized access. The security system will propose 
the use of PROMs and EPROMs as a possible alternative 
to magnetic storage of programs and will present an 
operational view of how semiconductor technology can be 
utilized for this purpose. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE USE OF FIRMWARE FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
‘COMPUTER ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS 
Ob j ective 
As stated in Chapter I, when developing a normative 
model, the goal must be clearly stated. The objective 
of the model to be presented here can be defined: 
To eliminate the probability of unauthorized 
changes to production programs which affect 
the accounting data base, and to insure that 
only audited, authorized programs have the 
ability to affect the accounting data base 
given that the accounting system is main¬ 
tained in a computer environment 
This objective requires some clarification of exactly 
what is to be achieved. Mautz and Sharaf, in thier 
Tentative Postulates of Auditing, state that, "The 
existence of a satisfactory system of internal control 
I 
eliminates the probabi I ity of irregularities." They 
then explain the distinction between the probability and 
possibiIity: 
It should be noted that the term "probability" 
rather than "possibility" is used. It is doubt¬ 
ful that the possibility of irreguI arities can 
ever be eliminated, although it can be reduced. 
Likewise, the term "eliminated" is used because 
that is exactly what the assumption means. But 
note it is the probability of irreguI arit i es 
that is eliminated, not the irreguI arities them¬ 
selves. IrreguI arities are still possible under 
good internal control, but they are no longer 
probable. On the other hand, if the internal 
control is not satisfactory, the errors and 
irreguI arities must be considered something 
more than merely possible.^ 
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Eliminating the possibility of fraud would assume that 
the creator of the security system could foresee a I I 
possible ways to circumvent the controls. This is impos¬ 
sible. The methods to be proposed should eliminate the 
possibility however, as they will allow for changes to 
the accounting system only under strict authorization 
procedures . 
Another point for clarification involves the terms, 
"programs which affect the accounting data base." This 
is meant to include any program which can create (write), 
update (re-write), or delete data items on the accounting 
data base. Put another way, it involves all programs 
which change the data base from its state prior to 
their execution. An important thing to note is that report 
generation programs which simply read the data from the data 
base and reformat that data for human use or otherwise, 
and which do not alter the data in any way, are not in¬ 
cluded in the protection scheme. 
There are several reasons for not securing programs 
which only read the data and do not alter it. First, 
the types of fraud that the proposed model will attempt 
to eliminate are those which affect changes to programs 
or change the data base directly. Since programs which 
only copy data from the storage media do not alter the 
stored data, they do not have the potential to commit 
the type of fraud which is of interest here. This does 
101 
not mean that "read-only” programs may not be fraudulent. 
They may have routines which change the data once it is 
transferred from the storage media for the purpose of 
covering up an embezzlement accomplished through other 
means. 
A second reason for not securing report generating 
programs is that it is felt that these programs are fre¬ 
quently changed to reflect new reporting formats. Since 
the proposed model wi I I make changes to programs more 
difficult, this might place an undue hardship on the 
operation of the computer facility. 
On the basis of the previous two points, when 
accounting programs are referenced in this chapter, it 
is meant to refer to those programs which affect the data 
base, not those that simply report based upon the data 
stored . 
Overv? ew 
Protection of accounting programs used in production 
will use the technology of Read-Only Memory (ROM) as 
explained in Chapter III. The use of this technology can 
eliminate the probability of unauthorized changes to 
software by requiring physical access to the hardware. 
This should eliminate changes through software means 
such as those initiated at terminals in remote locations. 
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The firmware design will also allow for the protec¬ 
tion of the accounting data base because the firmware 
will be resident in the hardware at a known location. By 
segregating the accounting data base from other programs 
and data, it will be possible to institute a "write- 
protect" mechanism by which the programs stored in firm¬ 
ware will have complete read/write capabilities while 
restricting all other programs run in central memory 
to only read the data. 
The following sections will present the two protec¬ 
tion mechanisms and will attempt to show the feasibility 
of such designs. Changes to existing hardware and soft¬ 
ware wi I I then be given in order to contrast the 
proposed system with existing systems. Following this, 
a section will be presented which explains an operational 
procedure for the production and installation of the firmware 
to show the effect of the model on the auditor. The final 
section attempts to present in a logical fashion, the improv- 
ments over existing security systems that are obtained 
when the firmware model is implemented. 
Protection of Programs 
Computer accounting programs vary greatly in the 
amount of computer memory they reguire in order to run. 
A typical general ledger system reguires less than 65K 
(65 thousand characters). Financial Technology, a soft- 
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ware vendor, has a general ledger and report writing system 
3 
for banks which will run in 54K. Software International, 
another software vendor, can provide a general ledger 
4 
systems that can run on a 32K minicomputer. These systems, 
designed for small or large businesses, are extremely 
flexible and allow for any chart of accounts and pro¬ 
vide for multiple cost center, branch or divisional 
record keeping. In addition to up-to-date records, they 
can maintain last year’s data and budget forecasts for 
comparison purposes. The space that these systems require 
is not only for the program instructions, but also for 
workspace needed for making calculations. The space 
necessary for the actual instructions is much less. 
This size requirement will be important in determining the 
amount of firmware required to store these programs. 
In line with the objective to secure the accounting 
system programs from unauthorized changes, it is hereby 
proposed that the use of Programmable Rxead-Only Memories 
(PROM) to store these programs will result in a higher 
level of security than is presently available and will 
virtually eliminate the probability of unauthorized 
chances. The reason for the greater security is that 
to change a program stored in PROM (firmware), which is 
installed as part of the mainframe hardware, one must have 
physical access to the hardware in which it is stored. 
Since physical access is much easier to control tnan log;- 
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cal access (access through terminals, etc.), the programs 
stored in the machine in this fashion will be less likely 
to be altered without authorization. 
There are several points which deserve clarification 
with respect to the proposed method to secure programs. 
First, the use of PROMs will include the use of fuse-link 
PROMs or ultra-violet Erasable PROMs (EPROMs). Mask 
produced Read-Only Memory (ROM) is too expensive because 
the software for an accounting system tends to be custom¬ 
ized for each firm. Since masked ROM is justifiable only 
when production quantities are greater than 10,000 units, 
and because its production lead time is often measured in 
weeks, it is clearly not applicable for use in accounting 
systems. Electrically Alterable Read-Only Memory (EAROM) is 
also not applicable to the situation as it permits 
alterations to the firmware while it is installed in the 
hardware. This is contrary to the objective to require 
physical access to the mainframe in order to incorporate 
changes. 
The use of PROM or EPROM will depend on the number 
of changes that wi I I occur to a program in a given time 
period. The breakeven point between these two types of 
firmware can be shown as follows: 
Assume: the life of an EPROM is determined 
when an attempt is made to reprogram it and 
it fails to program correctly. 
Let: A = cost of I kilobyte (KB) of fuse- 
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5 
reprogramming well over 100 times. 
The use of PROMs or EPROMs (hereafter referred to 
simply as PROMs), permits a higher level of security 
because it requires physical access to the hardware in 
which it is installed, in order to alter it. This makes 
the detection of system intruders much easier as their 
physical presence will be required in the computer room. 
This can be a great psychological deterrant as it would 
clearly identify the perpetrator if caught, something which 
is not so easy when the penetration occurs from remote 
sites. 
In addition to the psychological deterrant, there is 
a much greater level of security provided by physical 
access controls as their development has been ongoing 
long before the development of the electronic computer. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, many devices are presently 
available to limit access to the computer room: single 
entrances monitored by a guard or receptionist; emergency 
exits which open only from the inside and which sound 
alarms if opened; locked doors activated by keys or badges; 
double door "man traps"; and closed circuit monitors 
(surv i eI Iance cameras), just to name a few. 
The use of physical security to secure software has 
another advantage in addition to the high level of devel¬ 
opment. Since most firms already have it in place, there 
would be little additional cost to the firm. For examp Ie, 
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Champlin Petroleum Company presently has a card activated 
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locked door system for their computer room. Cards are 
authorized as to the doors which can be opened and by 
"time zones" which limit when those cards are allowed to 
open the doors they are authorized for. All unauthorized 
entry attempts are printed in red on an entry log, and leg¬ 
itimate entries can be printed in black if desired. This 
example shows the degree to which firms have gone to pro¬ 
tect their computer centers. It should be a most satis¬ 
factory control for the protection of the accounting soft¬ 
ware. 
As stated previously, the firmware will reside phys¬ 
ically in the hardware. While physical security may 
greatly limit the persons who have access to the computer 
room, an additional level of control is necessary to 
secure the firmware against those with legitimate access 
to the hardware. Since the firmware must reside in a 
place which is accessable in order to make changes when 
required, it would permit computer operators, maintenance 
engineers, and management the opportunity to replace 
the firmware. In order to protect against this possibil¬ 
ity, it is proposed that the locations for the firmware 
in the mainframe will be such that it is possible to lock 
and seal the location against casual access. This would 
imply that a metal box be built around the firmware lo¬ 
cations with a door which permits access for making replace- 
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ments. This door should be secured with no less than a 
lock of some sort and preferrably with an additional seal 
which would break upon opening the door. 
While the use of the lock on the door to the f i rm- 
ware is probably self evident, the use of the seal may 
not be. The seal would be placed on the door by the aud¬ 
itor when he has tested and installed the firmware and should 
be of the type that once it is broken, it cannot be 
unnoticably repaired. This would permit the auditor to 
tell if unauthorized attempts to access the firmware had 
been made between audits. If the seal has been broken, 
the firmware must be suspect and a full audit of the 
firmware will be called for. The auditor’s involvement 
in the production and installation of the firmware is a 
key to this security method and will be explained in 
detail in a later section of this" chapter. 
It should be clear that the use of firmware for securing 
the computer accounting system programs provides a greater 
level of security than is available when programs are 
stored on a magnetic media. It should no longer be poss¬ 
ible for persons to make unauthorized changes simply 
through software access. Physical access must also be 
gained. 
The use of firmware in large mainframe hardware 
should not cause any major problems. Recent releases 
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of new hardware such as the Amdahl V6 and V7 and the 
IBM 303X series, already make extensive use of semi¬ 
conductor technology. Lecht, in his book Waves of Change, 
predicts that, "During the System/80 era, 'pluggable firm¬ 
ware modules' may become available, giving IBM greater 
flexibility and control over hardware, software usage 
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and user performance.. It would appear therefore, that 
the use of firmware is not a radical idea, although its 
use for security purposes has not been widely contempla¬ 
ted . 
With the protection of programs occurring through 
the use of firmware, the protection of the accounting 
data base still remains. A protection mechanism is required 
to prevent programs, other than those in firmware, from 
accessing the accounting data base for the purpose of 
making changes directly to it. It is this problem which 
is add ressed next. 
Protection of the Accounting Data Base 
The use of firmware for the protection of accounting 
programs presents a unique opportunity to also secure the 
accounting data base against unauthorized changes. When 
programs are stored on a magnetic media such as disk, 
they may be copied to any Random Access Memory (RAM) 
locations in the mainframe for execution. This means 
that alI locations in RAM must be given the opportunity 
to make changes to any given data base. When programs 
are stored as firmware, however, they are permanently placed 
in the mainframe at a specific address location. This 
address would not change each time the program is run as 
is the case with software. Provided that all programs which 
will alter the data base are placed together in firm¬ 
ware, it should be possible to allow just those programs 
to alter the data base and to prohibit programs in RAM 
f rom doing so . 
In order for this procedure to be accomplished, the 
accounting data base must be separated from ether programs 
and data because this other information need not be 
protected from programs in RAM. This means that the 
accounting system will be provided with its own disk unit(s) 
upon which to store the accounting data. The protection 
mechanism will apply to only those segregated units with 
the other units left unprotected to maintain accessabiIity. 
The objective l^ere is to make changes to the accounting 
system more difficult, not changes to the whole computer 
system. 
By segregating the accounting data base to its own 
disk units, a Mwr i te-protect" mechanism can be included 
which will prevent programs other than those installed 
as firmware, from making any alterations to the protected 
disks. This write-protect feature would prevent all access¬ 
es by programs in RAM which would attempt to create, update. 
or delete any data items on the protected data base. It 
would not prohibit reading of the data by programs in RAM 
as report generating programs will not be stored in firm¬ 
ware but on disk, and as such must retain this capability. 
Permitting the read capability for programs in RAM is 
consistant with the objectives of this model as reading 
data does not alter it. If the privacy of the information 
stored on the protected unit becomes an issue, this read 
capability may also have to be prohibited. The privacy 
problem is beyond the scope of this dissertation and will 
not be addressed further. 
In describing how the write-protected mechanism 
would work, a little background material is required. 
In a computer systern, eIectronic signals which represent 
the data, are passed through the hardware according to 
the instructions given to the machine. The signals move 
over what is called a "bus” which is defined as, "A path 
over which information is transferred, from any of several 
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sources to any of several destinations." It is over 
such a data bus that information travels from the mainframe 
to the disk, where it is written as a magnetic pattern. 
A data bus is usually a two way path such that information 
travels over the same bus when it is read from the disk 
as when it is written. The objective of the write-protect 
mechanism is to prevent data signals from RAM to be written 
on the segregated disk units but not to inhibit RAM from 
receiving signals when reading. At the same time, programs 
in firmware must be permitted to both read and write in 
an uninhibited fashion. This objective can be met by 
designing the data bus such that the write-protect mechan¬ 
ism can be placed as shown in Figure 4-1. By placing the 
mechanism as indicated, the firmware is provided with an 
unimpeded data path to the disk while programs in RAM 
can be restricted. 
Direction of data flow during Read 
<- 
Direction of data flow during Write 
-> 
Figure 4-1: The WrIte-Protect Mechanism 
The actual mechanism may be as simple as the use of 
diodes, an electronic device which will permit signals 
to travel in one direction but not in the reverse. Be¬ 
cause of various complexities of computer architecture, a 
more elaborate mechanism may be required, butthe design 
of such is beyond the expertise of this researcher. The 
actual mechanism is not as critical as the placement of 
it in the hardware. If the data bus is run through the 
locked box where the firmware is located, it would be 
possible to lock and seal the write-protect mechanism 
and give it the same protection as is given the f i rm- 
wa re. 
While the write-protect mechanism for disk may be 
slightly difficult to implement, there have been some recent 
developments which may make protection of the accounting 
data base easier. It now appears that a new memory media, 
called bubble memory, will soon be replacing the use of 
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magnetic storage media such as disk and tape. Bubble 
memories have the same desirable properties as magnetic 
media in that they are capable of retaining information 
in the absence of external power and are easily altered. 
Their advantage is that they are placed on chips, similar 
to ROM, and can be physically installed in the mainframe. 
The use of bubble memory in lieu of disk would permit the 
dedication of bubble chips for the firmware. The bubble 
memory could then be installed in the locked box along 
with the firmware providing the database with the same 
protection given the firmware and write-protect 
mec ha nism. 
Changes Required to Existing Systems 
Ha rdwa re. The security system proposed implies that 
some major changes must occur to the computer equipment 
in order for the system to become functional. As pre¬ 
viously noted, Lecht indicated that IBM may already be 
planning to use firmware in order to gain more control over 
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use of their hardware. Since IBM is the well accepted 
leader In the computer industry, it is very likely that the 
other computer manufacturers will follow suit. If 
firmware is already planned for in the design of new 
hardware, its use for security purposes should not create 
any major difficulties. 
A minor change to the mainframe hardware because 
of the firmware model will be the inclusion of the locked 
and sealed box in which the firmware will be located. 
This is not anticipated to cause major problems as the box 
itself will not require much additional space. It 
would simply involve enclosing some of the firmware 
locations already in the machine. Access to these locations 
for the purpose of installing the firmware should be easy 
as maintenance of the mainframe requires easy access to 
all parts of the hardware. 
The construction of the locked and sealed box 
should consist of solid metal walls to fully enclose the 
firmware locations. The use of metal is to deter forced 
entry and should make entries other than through the locked 
door readily visible. This does not mean that forced 
entry is not possible, only that it will be extremely 
difficult to accomplish so that it is not easily identifi¬ 
able. The solid wall requirement may need to be relaxed 
if the mainframe is of air cooled construction. In this 
case, it may be necessary to build a cage arrangement to 
allow for air to pass through the box in order to cool the 
firmware. It would be required that the holes in the 
cage be smaI I enough as to prevent a firmware chip from 
passing through else it might be possible for some¬ 
one to replace the chips without forceably entering the 
box. 
Other than the cooling problem, the only other trouble 
foreseen might be electronic interferences caused by the 
use of metal for the box construction. This is not anti¬ 
cipated to be a major problem as the construction of the 
hardware is largely metallic and does not appear to cause 
any problems, yet the possibility exists. 
The largest and most difficult hardware change wil! 
occur with the implementation of the write-protect mechan¬ 
ism. In order for this mechanism to work, it will rec- 
that the disks used to store the accounting data be seg 
gated from the rest of the system storage media. This 
may mean that the segregated units will require their 
own data channel and channel controller in order to 
maintain the separation. This may also involve some inter¬ 
action problems between the hardware changes and the oper¬ 
ating system but it is assumed that these difficulties can 
be worked out. 
As part of the write-protect mechanism, a method 
should be worked out which could detect when programs in 
RAM attempt to write on the protected units. This 
method should notify the security system of the attempted 
security violation so that the attempt is logged and the 
offending program is halted. It would be preferred that 
this mechanism be instituted through hardware means, similar 
to the rings-of-protection mechanism of Multics, as hard¬ 
ware based systems provide higher levels of security and 
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are less vulnerable. 
Software. The most serious problems with the use of the 
proposed security methodology is with respect to the 
changes to existing software. Operating systems, security 
routines, and compilers will all reouire changes in order 
to implement the firmware model. The changes will be 
difficult in the sense that these software products are 
extremely complex programs developed over many years. 
Some of the required changes will require major modifi- 
cations to these systems which may take some time. 
Operating systems will be affected by both the use 
of firmware and the write-protect mechanism. As previ¬ 
ously noted, firmware use is already being planned for so 
this may assist in the number of changes that need to be 
made. The operating system must be instructed of what 
addresses contain the firmware so that no attempt will 
be made to write in the firmware locations. This is not 
a major problem as an attempt to write would not be success¬ 
ful anyway as the mainframe hardware would not have the 
necessary electronics to make the changes. Still it is 
a concern as the operating system should be able to detect 
attempts to write in order to notify the security rou¬ 
tines of the violation. It may be possible to install 
this notification process in the hardware as is proposed 
for the write-protect mechanism, but it would still require 
operating system involvement in order to determine the 
offending program. 
The larger problem with operating system changes will 
be with respect to the write-protect mechanism. When the 
programs In firmware wish to write on the protected units, 
they wi I I place the data to be written on the data bus 
and notify the operating system what should be done with 
it. It will still be the responsibility of the operating 
system to notify the channel controller that the data is 
on the bus and where It should be placed. From that point 
it is up to the channel controller to actually place the 
information on the storage media. This may require that 
the channel controller have buffer space if the data is 
received faster than the controller can take appropriate 
action. These interactions between firmware, the opera¬ 
ting system, and the channel controller may be difficult 
but it is assumed that they are not insurmountable. 
Another alteration to the operating system will 
concern its involvement when a security violation is 
discovered by the write-protect mechanism. In addition 
to notifying the security routines of the violation, the 
operating system must be able to determine the offending 
program and to halt its execution. 
Security systems are usually an integral part of the 
operating system but may be segregated from other opera¬ 
ting system duties as in the case of the "security kernal" 
approach. It is often difficult to separate the two in 
practice however, as the amount of interaction between 
the two is extensive. It is considered to be a separate 
entity here as it has a very specific duty and may strongly 
depend upon the normal operating system duties to notify 
it of violation attempts. It is assumed that the routines 
will take appropriate action when it is discovered that 
a write violation has occurred either to the firmware or 
the write-protected channel. This action would involve 
logging the violation, determining the offending program 
with the aid of other routines in the operating system, 
and notifying the operating system to halt the offending 
program. This should not be any major change from the 
existing duties of security systems. 
The most serious changes to software as a result of 
the firmware model will occur with the compilers. Compil¬ 
ers are large programs which convert programs written In 
high level languages such as COBOL or FORTRAN, to machine 
language. Since most application programs are written 
in a high level language, they must go througy a compilation 
phase before they can be executed. The Drograms to be 
stored in firmware will be those that have already gone 
through the compilation phase (ie. in machine language) 
as is the current practice for storing production versions 
on disk. Compilers are presently written to generate 
the machine language In such a form that it is relocatable 
in memory because a program may be loaded into different 
sections of* memory each time the program is run. This will 
no longer be necessary with firmware as the firmware will 
be permanently installed In the mainframe at a specific 
address. There will no longer be a need for relocatable 
code. This is not an absolute requirement as It could still 
work with the base address always constant but it would 
greatly enhance execution time if actual addresses didn'^ 
have to be calculated each time. 
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A bigger problem for compilers will be with the use 
of workspace. AlI programs require the use of RAM to 
store temporary values as necessary. The compiler must 
be able to separate instructions and constants which 
will be placed in firmware from variables which will require 
RAM. While the instructions and constants will have fixed 
addresses in ROM, the locations for the temporary values 
in RAM could be relocatable and determined at run time. 
This places a rather large burden on the compiler to make 
these allocations, but it is necessary in order to achieve 
efficient use of memory. An alternative method which is 
less efficient but may be easier to implement, is to 
dedicate a certain amount of RAM to the firmware and to 
dedicate addresses for specific variables. This would 
relax the relocatable requirement, but it would still 
force the compiler to separate variables from instructions 
and constants. This alternative may be desirable from a 
security standpoint as the RAM dedicated to the firmware 
could be installed in the locked box with the firmware. 
It should be apparent that the changes to the hard¬ 
ware and software are not so difficult that they cannot be 
overcome. Some of the difficulties with these changes 
have been identified and some possible solutions proposed. 
The actual solutions that may be necessary may be consider¬ 
ably different as many problems cannot be foreseen. These 
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solutions must wait until an actual working model is 
attempted. 
Procedures to Produce Firmware 
The previous two sections have proposed methods by 
which computer programs and data can be secured from 
unauthorized change. This section will present a descrip¬ 
tion on how those methods can be made operational. The 
purpose here is to expand on the feasibility concept to 
show that not only are the ideas sound from an engineering 
standpoint, but also in use. 
The acquisition of the computer accounting software 
will be in the fashion normally done by the given firm 
which implements the firmware model. This would mean 
that the programs may be developed in-house or purchased 
from a software vendor who provides the finished product. 
It is important that the auditor be involved right from 
the beginning to insure that adequate controls are built 
into the software such as checking for invalid input data, 
leaving well documented audit trails, and the like. The 
early involvement of the auditor is important as it is 
much easier to build controls into a system during the 
design phase than it is to try and add the controls after 
the system is completed. It may also be true that controls 
added on afterward may not be as efficient nor as complete 
as those originally designed into the system. 
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If the software is not developed in-house, the auditor 
may be very helpful in the evaluation of products from 
different vendors. While it may not be possible to suggest 
controls to the vendor, the auditor can comment on the 
sufficiency of the controls that do exist. 
Essentially, the aquisition phase is no different 
from present practice. The changes begin after this point, 
when the system is to become operational. In present 
systems, after loading the system and some minor testing, 
the system would be deemed operational and would be 
treated as a normal production process. The firmware model 
calls for more extensive testing and greater auditor 
involvement. While the client may continue to test the sys 
tern to insure tht it meets his needs, the firmware model 
requires that the auditors be called in to do extensive 
testing of the software before the system is allowed to 
become operational. The prime purpose of this audit 
will be to test the propriety of the programs, especially 
with respect to the possibility of fraudulent routines. 
This implies, of course, that the auditors have the ex¬ 
pertise in EDP auditing to determine the correctness 
of the software. Without this expertise, the firmware 
model will be greatly weakened as it would be possible 
for fraudulent routines to go unnoticed during the audit. 
The techniques for this software audit would include 
some of those explained in Chapter II. The most likely 
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techniques would be use of test decks with shadowing 
routines to insure that all paths of a program are tested, 
and software review, possibly using a structured walk¬ 
through technique. These methods are the ones most likely 
to detect fraudulent routines and are really the only 
way the auditor can be assured of the propriety of the 
software. The cost for this type of testing may be high 
but is clearly justifiable when it is these programs 
which will affect the accounting data base. It will 
be shown that this higher initial audit cost may permit 
lower costs for the annual audit as future testing of the 
software wi I I not be as intense. 
When the auditor is satisfied with the propriety of 
the software, the production of the firmware will begin. 
This production will take place under auditor supervision 
to insure that correct procedures are followed and that 
no changes occur to the system between the software audit 
and the production of the firmware. To further insure 
that no changes will take place, it is recommended that 
al I other machine activity be shut down in order to pre¬ 
vent other programs on the machine from interfering with 
the firmware production process. 
It is assumed that the auditor has a copy of the 
program to be installed in firmware and has reviewed the 
listing prior to the production process. When all is 
prepared, the software wi I I be loaded from the auditor 
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controlled copy into the client’s machine. This program 
will then be compiled and tested using test decks and 
shadowing routines to compliment the software review. 
When all testing is satisfied, the compiled program will 
be passed to a PROM programming device for the purpose 
of "burning" the certified software as firmware. The 
transfer of the compiled program to the PROM programmer 
will take place under the control of the PROM burning 
software which has been certified by the EDP auditor as 
being correct. The certification of the PROM burning pro¬ 
gram should not be difficult as this software is very short 
and would take only a few minutes to review. 
It is suggested that a hash count of the number of 
"one" bits in the firmware be taken for the purpose of 
future audits. This hash count total can be maintained 
under auditor control and may be useful in subsequent 
audits to verify that the firmware has not been changed 
since its production. 
When the firmware production is complete, the auditor 
will review the system log to reassure that proper pro¬ 
cedures have been followed. The following items should 
a ppea r on the log: 
(1) shut down of all system activity not con¬ 
cerned with the production of the firmware 
(2) the source program will be loaded from an 
auditor controlled copy 
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(3) the compiler will be called in and 
the source program will be compiled into 
object code 
(4) execution of the program for test deck¬ 
ing and shadowing 
(5) the PROM programming software will be 
called in from disk and listed for review 
(6) the PROM programming software will De 
executed 
(7) a hash count will be taken of the firm¬ 
ware as burned. 
Once the PROM chips have been loaded, tney will be 
physically transferred from the PROM programming device 
to a blank memory board wnich can be installed in the 
mainframe. Before installing the firmware, the auditor 
should check the seal on the locked box to insure that 
the door has not been tampered with. If possible, it 
would be desirable that the seals be numbered in some 
fashion so that the auditor could verify that the seal 
in place was, in fact, the last one put on. At a 
minimum, the auditor should check the seal to see that it 
has not been broken. 
At this point, the auditor will unlock the box with 
either a key or a combination known only to him. The seal 
will then be broken and tne firmware installed in its 
intended location. The door will then be relocked and 
a new seal placed on the door. 
It may be desiraole for The auditor to test the 
firmware to insure that it is functioning properly. 
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could be done by using the same test deck used to test 
the software and comparing the results. The purpose here 
is to insure that the PROMs were successfully programmed. 
The procedure just described should be able to insure 
the proper production and installation of the firmware. 
Tne time necessary for the whole procedure should be less 
than two hours, with half of that time required just to 
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program the PROMs. If it is undesirable to tie up the 
computer for that long a period, it may be possible to 
program the PROMs under microcomputer control. In this 
case, the large mainframe would pass the compiled program 
to a microcomputer which could then be disconnected from 
the mainframe while the programming takes place. In the 
meantime, the larger mainframe can take on other responsi- 
b i I i ties. 
The use of firmware -for the storage of production 
accounting programs does not preclude the storage of the 
same programs on a magnetic media. It may be beneficial 
for a copy to be stored on disk for the purpose of 
making changes to the programs when alterations are 
required. These magnetically stored versions would not 
be able to affect the data base because of the write- 
protect mechanism but they can provide the opportunity 
to make changes and to test the effect of those changes 
before the updated programs are placed into production. 
The procedures to place updated programs into pro- 
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ducfion will be very similar to those proposed for new 
programs although the testing need not be as extensive. 
Under these circumstances, it may be desirable to compare 
the updated version with the firmware version using a 
source code/object code compare package and to focus the 
software audit primarily on the changes. Some review of 
the unchanged instructions may be necessary as it is 
possible that interactions may occur between the new 
code and the existing code which would not be apparent by 
review of the new code alone. The extent of the review 
will be dependent on the changes which are to be made. 
Other than the extent of the software testing, the 
procedures for changing existing firmware will follow 
those for new software with respect to the production of 
the firmware and its installation in the locked and 
sealed box. The firmware which is being replaced should 
not be immediately thrown away (as in the use of PROMs) 
or erased (as in the use of EPROMs) as the updated program 
may contain bugs which are not immediately discovered. 
Instead, the old firmware should be kept under auditor 
control for some period of time, possibly until the next 
change, as a form of backup. If required, the backup 
version of firmware could be quickly installed without 
going through the whole production procedure. 
It should be obvious that the procedures described 
will require a great a mo unt of auditor involvement. It 
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is important that a commitment from the auditor be gained 
in order for this procedure to be successful. This is 
recognized as a problem area as auditors have been reluc¬ 
tant to become more involved in the actual implementation 
of security. They have preferred to simply audit the 
controls. This reluctance must change however, as computer 
frauds have been growing in recent years and as previously 
noted, it is likely that Congress may force the auditor 
to become responsible for failure to detect fraud. It 
would be in the auditor’s best interest to take appropriate 
action now before they are forced tc* as it will al low for 
the development of procedures which satisfy the fraud 
detection requirement. 
The firmware procedures assume that the auditors 
conducting the software audit have the necessary expertise. 
At the present time, EDP auditors may be weak in this 
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respect but it is the opinion of this researcher that 
this will not continue because the number of firms relying 
on computers to maintain the accounting system continues 
to grow. The increasing use by clients will force the 
auditors to become more adept at auditing EDP. The use of 
firmware is not one which can begin tomorrow but must be 
incorporated into the design of the hardware, a procedure 
which will take time. It is hoped that by the time the 
hardware is ready to accept the use of firmware that the 
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auditors will have "geared up" for its impact. One pos¬ 
sible method is through the development of specialized 
software auditors who would conduct the production of 
the firmware but who may not be involved in the yearly 
audit. This would imply that only these specialists 
require the expertise necessary to conduct the software 
audit. 
The expense incurred by the firmware model is two 
fold: the cost of the firmware, and the cost of the pro¬ 
cedures to produce it. The cost to store a 65K program 
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in EPROM is presently less than $900 with the price 
likely to decrease in the near future as larger chips 
are announced. 
The expense incurred by the firmware procedures 
will be dependent on how often the auditor must be called 
in and the difficulty of the software to be examined. 
The additional expense of frequent auditor involvement 
may encourage firms to batch changes to the system so 
they can all be done at once. This could be at set times 
in the year or possibly only once a year with the expecta- 
j 
tion that special calls may be needed under emergency 
situations. This may turn out to be beneficial to 
the firm as in many cases, the institution of changes to 
existing software is a result of "fire fighting" solutions 
to short range problems. This type of operation often 
results in changes which are not fully tested, leading 
to unexpected results. By encouraging the batching of 
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changes, testing may be more extensive, yet with an over- 
alI decrease in testing time because fewer tests will be 
conducted. 
The effect of the use of firmware on the yearly audit 
will be great. Present audits may use test decks to test 
the software but this should no longer be necessary as 
the testing of the software wi I I have Deen conducted 
before the firmware was produced. If the firmware is 
assumed to be unalterable, no further testing would be 
required. AlI that would be necessary is to check to see 
that the seal on the locked box has not been broken. 
This much reliance on the firmware model is not 
likely to occur in practice. Scepticism may be a desir¬ 
able trait in auditors and they may want to test the firm¬ 
ware just to make sure. Methods other than test decking 
may be more applicable however. If a hash total is taken 
at the production of the firmware, a hash count could also 
be taken at the yearly audit and compared with the original 
figure. This is not a foolproof method unless the hash 
total were kept secret, which is doubtful. A more effec¬ 
tive means would be through the use of object code compare. 
If the auditor controls a copy of the program as it was 
installed as firmware, he could use this product to compare 
it to the version installed in the machine. This use of 
object code compare does not suffer from previously noted 
weaknesses of this technique as the auditor can be assured 
that the firmware version is the one actually used in pro- 
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duction . 
The check on the seal, the use of a hash count, and 
use of the object code compare should be more than 
sufficient to assure the propriety of the firmware in 
the yearly audit. All three of these techniques are 
quick and should decrease the amount of time spent in the 
audit for the testing of software. This may allow for 
more time to be spent on methods which can detect ’input 
manipulations, the most serious threat. 
Cone Ius i ons 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the 
objective of the proposed security method was: 
To eliminate the probability of unauthorized 
changes to production programs which affect the 
accounting data base, and to insure that only 
audited, authorized programs have the ability 
to affect the accounting data base given that 
the accounting system is maintained in a 
computer environment. 
It is felt that the proposed security methods meet this 
objective fully. The use of firmware should eliminate 
the probability from unauthorized changes for the follow¬ 
ing reasons : 
( I ) cha nges cannot 
is still i nstaI Ied 
mainframe will not 
to change it 
be made to firmware while it 
in the hardware because the 
contain the electronics required 
l2) since physical access to the hardware is 
required in order to change the firmware and 
because physical access controls are more 
easily implemented and provide higher levels 
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of security, the likelihood of access to 
the firmware is virtually eliminated 
(3) the use of a lock on the firmware 
installation door will deter access by those 
that would normally have access to the hardware 
(4) the use of the seal on the firmware installation 
door will indicate illicit access to the firmware 
if it occurs 
This is an improvement over existing security systems 
because: 
(1) present software systems are not impenetrable 
(2) physical access security is easier and much 
more highly developed than software security 
(3) changes to magnetically stored programs can 
be made without a trace 
The write-protect mechanism will assure that only 
audited authorized programs affect the accounting data 
base because: 
(1) only programs stored as firmware will have 
two-way access to the accounting data base 
(2) all programs in firmware will be fully 
audited before installation 
As noted in the beginning of this chapter, the pro¬ 
posed model should eliminate the "probability" of unau¬ 
thorized changes, not eliminate the MpossibiIity." The 
next chapter presents methods which can circumvent the 
proposed controls. While these weaknesses are recog¬ 
nized as potential hazards, their probability of 
occurring is very remote. 
The proposed firmware model is highly feasible. The 
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technology for its implementation presently exists and 
is relatively inexpensive when compared to the potential 
losses it can prevent. The procedures for implementation 
have been explained and it has been shown that they too 
are feasible. The difficulty will be in getting the 
increased auditor involvement. 
In the next chapter, the opinions of various indi¬ 
viduals from different backgrounds will be evaluated and 
some of the potential ways to circumvent the firmware 
model will be presented. 
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In order to store 65,000 (65K) bytes, 32 2716 
(2K byte) EPROM chips will be required. Each 2716 requires 
100 seconds to fully program (2716 UV Erasable PROM Data 
Sheet, Itel Corp., 1978), for a total time of approximately 
54 minutes (3200 seconds) for all 65K. 
I 3 
Telephone interview with Harvey S. Gellman in 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, on June 6, 1978. 
I 4 
Texas Instruments TMS 2532 EPROM chips hold 4K 
of 8 bit bytes (32,000 bits) at a cost of *53 each. To 
store 65K, a 16 socket memory board will be needed at 
a cost of approximately $50. Total cost is therefore 
$898 (16 * $53 + $50 ) . 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION OF THE FIRMWARE MODEL 
I ntrod uct j on 
In Chapter I it was stated that the firmware model 
was to be presented to persons in the areas of computer 
fraud, computer auditing, computer security, and computer 
hardware design as a method of testing the feasibility 
and practicality of the proposed security method. This 
chapter will present the results of those interviews and 
will also provide some of the limitations and ways in 
which the model may be circumvented. 
The results of the interviews, presented here in 
alphabetical order, are the consequence of sending a copy 
of a short, ten page working paper on the firmware model 
to persons identified by their mention in the literature 
or by having been suggested by the dissertation committee 
or other interviewees. The working paper was accompanied 
by a letter which requested a personal interview with the 
person involved. This met with limited success. Inter¬ 
views which were granted lasted from fifteen minutes to 
nearly two hours. The model was further explained during 
thattime and the interviewee’s comments and criticisms 
were received. In those cases where personal interviews 
were not granted, many of the contacted persons responded 
by letter or telephone. These non-personal results were 
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of varying degrees of comoleteness in their discussion of 
the mode I. 
Preceeding each of the interview results is a short 
biographical sketch which seeks to identify the reasons why 
the person was chosen. "'able 5-1 summarizes the types 
of people contacted and the ways in which their comments 
were received. Since many of the interviewees raised 
similar questions regarding the model, responses to all 
questions will be presented after the interview results. 
Results of Interviews 
Dona Id L. Adams. Mr. Adams is the Managing Director of Ad¬ 
ministrative Services for the American Institute of Cert¬ 
ified Public Accountants (AICPA). He is also the former 
editor of the ’’Accounting and EDP” by-line in the Journal 
of Accountancy and is the author of several articles dealing 
with computer auditing which have appeared in EDPACS 
and the Journal of Accountancy. 
-—^Area 
ResDonsi^^ 
Compute r 
F ra ud 
Compute r 
Auditing 
Computer 
Security 
Compute r 
Ha rdware 
Persona 1 
1nterview Allen 
Adams 
Gui1tinan 
0’Ma ra 
Te1eDhone 
1 nterview Gel 1ma n Courtney Ogd i n 
Written 
Response Pa r ke r Anderson Withington 
Table 5-1: Professional Areas and Response Types of 
Persons Contacted 
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Mr. Adams was interviewed at AICPA headquarters in New 
York City at which time he presented his feelings on the 
firmware model and on the future of computer auditing in 
general. He felt that the model is very reasonable as 
it closely parallels a security procedure which he has 
been advocating for some time. He has encouraged IBM 
to make available a procedure by which password lists for 
authenticating users at sign-on could be placed In firmware 
to prevent unauthorized changes. Since the firmware 
model presented here uses the same method for securing 
accounting software, he felt that the model Is highly 
valid. He believed that changes to software are too easy 
at the present time and said that, "I applaud the trend 
for anything we can do to create a trend toward making It 
tougher.” Mr. Adams was particularly Impressed with the 
method of locking up the firmware In the sealed box to 
give It the additional layer of protection. 
Mr. Adams did foresee some problems with the Implemen¬ 
tation of the model, however. One particular problem 
was that software specialists are certainly not going to 
be happy when software changes become more difficult 
than they already are. This Is an expected conflict when 
the auditor calls for more control. Computer people usually 
desire easier methods by which to do their Jobs. 
Another problem Identified by Mr. Adams was that it 
might still be possible to wire around the firmware and 
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write-protect mechanisms in order to disable them. He 
feared that the growing hobby computer market is rapidly 
training a vast group of people who understand the tech¬ 
nology by which such hardware a I terations couId be made. 
He conceded however, that adequate physical access controls 
should greatly limit this type of threat. 
With respect to the review of software by auditors, 
Mr. Adams believed that adequate tools presently exist 
to audit for fraud but they are not commonly used because 
they are too expensive. If the SEC were to regulate 
the accounting profession as Congressman Moss suggests, and 
were to require the auditor to be responsible for fraud, 
these tools could be used but the added expense may be too 
much for the client to bear. Mr. Adams has taken part 
In some software reviews, usually on important routines 
such as password control and edit systems, but finds this 
type of audit to be used infrequently. The common technique 
for software review is desk checking of the code with the 
aid of automatic flowcharting and cross-reference listings. 
He believed that shadowing routines with test decks are 
not commonly used because the shadowing routines add so 
much overhead to the run times. 
In conclusion, Mr. Adams felt that the firmware model 
may be applicable to systems of the future, especially 
for those cases in which software changes are infrequent. 
140 
Brandt R. Allen. Mr. Allen is a Professor at the Colgate- 
Darden Graduate School of Business Administration at the 
University of Virginia. He is the author of numerous 
articles on computer fraud which have appeared in such 
journals as the Harvard Business Review. Financial 
Executive, Data Management, and the Journal of Accountancy. 
He frequently appears at conferences and conventions to 
discuss his on-going research into computer based fraud. 
In addition, he serves on the advisory council for the 
Computer Security Institute. 
In a personal interview conducted at the University 
of Virginia, Mr. Allen indicated that while he believed 
the firmware model to be feasible and that it would provide 
a higher level of security, there are several practical 
problems which may limit its use with respect to accounting 
systems. The primary difficulty rests with the limitations 
on alterations that are imposed by the model. He held 
an admittedly pessimistic opinion that programs are altered 
every week. If this is the case, the firmware model 
with its extensive software review and production pro¬ 
cesses may be too difficult to be effectively implemented* 
Mr. Allen did not know of any statistics which have 
been collected with respect to program changes and 
felt that this may be an area worthy of further research. 
He expected that changes are more likely to programs devel¬ 
oped "in-house" because firms which develop their own so ^T- 
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ware know the programs and have adequate maintenance staffs 
to affect the changes. Programs purchased from software 
vendors would be less likely to be altered. He saw two 
trends that may be favorable to the firmware model however, 
with increasing use of purchased software which is not 
changed as often, and with more batching of changes occurring 
at longer intervals. 
The second problem area identified by Mr. Allen was 
the use of auditors for review of the software before 
firmware production. He felt that external auditors 
rarely, if ever, audit software and that they would never 
comment on it if they did, because they have no standards 
by which to judge. To say that a given piece of software 
is not fraudulent may leave the external auditor liable 
if fraudulent routines are later discovered. Mr. Allen 
also felt that fraud is not necessarily the responsibility 
of the external auditor unless it is material. A $5 
million fraud may be material to a small manufacturing 
firm but it would not concern the auditors of Exxon. 
Mr. Allen felt that the greatest hope for software 
review rests with the internal auditors. He has found 
that internal auditors are beginning to take on the respon¬ 
sibility to see that software is not changed and are using 
techniques such as code compares to assist in this 
type of audit. The problem is that auditors will only 
use the tools that they have and know. Mr. Allen did not 
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feel that auditors have the necessary tools which can 
adequately test the propriety of software. If a firm 
does not have an internal audit staff, Mr. Allen suggested 
the possibility of an Independent group to review the 
software. While no such group presently exists, he felt 
that the market is calling for it. The problem with 
third party review Is In what they could say about a 
given piece of software. It is not possible to flatly 
say that a given piece of software wiI I not commit 
fraud because something may have been missed. It is 
only possible to say that the software j_s_ fraudulent 
when illicit routines are discovered. 
An additional point brought out by Mr. Allen which is 
not directly related to computer fraud but to computer 
crime, is the fact that programs locked up in firmware 
are less vulnerable to theft. He spoke of the case of the 
programmer who stole all the versions of an important pro¬ 
gram and held them for ransom. Placing the firmware in 
the locked and sealed box would make this crime less likely. 
Mr. Allen felt that the persons most likely to be 
interested in the use of firmware for security are not 
in the financial community but the federal government. 
He contended that the only reason IBM Is concerned with 
computer and operating system security is that the government 
requires it on the systems they purchase. Since IBM 
must design these systems, they then try to seI I them to 
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commercial users to try and recover more of the design 
costs. He felt that the accounting profession would 
not be quick in accepting the firmware method because 
they are presently active enough trying to do traditional 
audits. 
James P. Anderson. Mr. Anderson is a computer consultant 
and author concerned with computer security. His article 
I 
In Advances in Computers, which explains a method of 
encrypting random access data files, is the classic ref¬ 
erence on the topic. His present consulting area 
is primarily concerned with breaking operating system 
security controls. He was suggested as a good person 
to contact during the interview with Brandt Allen. 
After receiving a copy of the working paper, Mr. 
Anderson wrote back a rather detailed letter outlining his 
reactions. While no personal contact was made which 
might have clarified the model further, many of his comments 
showed great insight into the operation of the firmware 
technique . 
Mr. Anderson felt that the idea would clearly work if 
the computer system to which it is applied is dedicated 
to the accounting functions to be protected as a stand¬ 
alone system. He foresaw considerable difficulty in 
adapting It for use on any resource-sharing (e.g. multipro¬ 
gramming) system because of the greater interaction be¬ 
tween executing programs and the operating system. 
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He suggested that under these circumstances It may be 
possible to place substantial parts of the operating sys¬ 
tem also In firmware as a method to overcome many of the 
Interaction difficulties. 
Another problem Mr. Anderson foresaw was that the 
firmware will take up addresses in the computer’s main 
memory which will become unavailable for other uses. He 
suggested the use of a switch which would indicate whether 
the firmware or RAM locations for a given segment of 
memory were to be used in execution, thereby allowing the 
same addresses to be used for two purposes. 
In conclusion, Mr. Anderson felt that the firmware 
approach would be most applicable in "turn-key” systems 
where the interaction between the appI icat I on programs and 
the operating system is well known. In this situation, the 
problems for further study would focus on how the system 
could be maintained and how other applications, not in 
firmware, could utilize the system. 
Robert Courtney, Jr. Mr. Courtney is Director of Computer 
Security for International Business Machines (IBM) and 
author of several articles dealing with data security. 
His current research is concerned with "risk analysis” 
of computer operations as a method to determine effective 
and cost justifiable controls. 
A telephone interview was conducted with Mr. Courtney 
in which we discussed the working paper sent to him earlier 
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Mr. Courtney was very pessimistic on the usefulness of the 
firmware model and felt that it was "an elaborate solution 
to a non-problem." It is his opinion that the threat from 
unauthorized program changes is so small that it is not 
worth the trouble of trying to protect against it. His 
measure of the problem was the amount of customer pressure 
IBM felt to develop controls which would combat this type 
of threat. Pressure which he said was non-existant. 
He said that IBM does feel a considerable amount of 
pressure to make program changes easier, an idea which is 
contrary to the direction of the firmware model. 
When confronted with statistics obtained from the 
literature on the types of computer fraud, Mr. Courtney 
rapidly dismissed them as misleading. He contended that 
80 percent of the cases of fraud do not get publicized 
because firms in the private sector are reluctant to ad¬ 
mit them. Since the statistics in the literature are 
based on publicized frauds, Mr. Courtney maintained that they 
are so seriously biased as to be nearly useless. 
Mr. Courtney felt that 50 to 80 percent of the data 
security problem Is with respect to errors and omissions 
and this is where research should be concentrated. The 
Issue of fraud, especially from system penetrators and 
dishonest employees who change code, is so small as not 
to be worth the trouble of protection. He felt that 
current control mechanisms are more than adequate to 
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safeguard against the potential threats from these areas. 
Ha rvey S. GeI Ima n. Mr. Gel Iman is a partner in the com¬ 
puter consulting firm of GelIman, Hayward & Partners, Ltd. 
in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. He is an author of articles 
dealing with computer fraud which have appeared in 
Computers & Automation. The Internal Auditor, and the 
Journal of Systems Management. 
Mr. GelIman called by phone after having received a 
copy of the working paper. He found the firmware model 
to be an "intriguing" solution but felt there might be 
some feasibility problems with respect to cost and the 
complexity of operating systems. He questioned whether 
the cost to review the software and the cost of the firmware 
chips were appropriate given the probability of fraud 
through software means. Like many of the other interviewees, 
he saw considerable problems with the interaction between 
operating systems and the firmware but he could not be 
specific on what these difficulties would encompass. 
Mr. GelIman felt that an easy way to circumvent the 
firmware protection scheme was to alter the off-site, 
backup copy of the data base and then to somehow destroy 
the on-site copies, causing the backup copy to be loaded. 
This would mean that the system would be restarted with a 
data base containing deliberate falsifications. 
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Also mentioned during our discussion was a common 
viewpoint that EDP auditors are weak and could not be 
expected to detect fraud in the software. Mr. Gellman 
contended that almost every case of computer fraud is 
detected by accident, not by determined review. With 
this past experience it would be difficult to expect 
auditors to detect fraudulent routines in software. 
Richa rd Gu ?11 ? nan. Mr. Guiltinan is a partner with the 
accounting firm of Arthur Andersen & Co. and is chairman 
of the AICPA Subcommittee on Computer Auditing. Mr. 
Guiltinan devotes a substantial part of his time in both 
positions on the problems with EDP and auditing. 
Mr. Guiltinan was contacted at an EDP Audit Symposium 
conducted at the University of Massachusetts. Mr. Guil¬ 
tinan was attending the symposium as chairperson of a 
discussion session on training programs for EDP auditors. 
This researcher had several opportunities to talk with 
him during this time and Mr. Guiltinan graciously read the 
working paper and commented on it during his stay. 
Mr. Guiltinan has been encouraging IBM to install their 
operating systems physically in hardware (via firmware) 
because he feels that the flexibility of software operating 
systems and the numerous changes that software engineers 
are affecting to It, makes it nearly possible for auditors 
to be sure of the security of the accounting system. When 
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presented with the possibility of also placing the account¬ 
ing system in firmware, Mr. Guiltinan replied that he had 
never "thought of carrying it "that far down" but he 
couldn’t see why it wasn’t possible. 
With respect to the auditor’s ability to detect fraud, 
Mr. Guiltinan felt that new techniques will be developed. 
He believed that Congress is likely to regulate the account 
ing profession in the future and that a certain outgrowth 
of this would be to hold auditors responsible for fraud. 
This would force the auditors to devise new fraud detection 
techniques in order to protect themselves. 
When presented with the working paper, Mr. Guiltinan 
felt that it may be a little impractical to call in the 
auditor to verify each change before the firmware is burned 
This would be very expensive in cost and time although 
when told that this would apply only for programs which 
update the data base and not report generators, he agreed 
that it may not be as serious a problem as he had first 
a nticipated. 
Mr. Guiltinan felt that the firmware concept may have 
acceptance problems because auditors know very little 
about PROM and EPROM and may be scared off just because 
of the technical nature of the method. 
Carol A. Oqdin. Ms. Ogdin is the technical editor for 
Mini-Micro Systems, in which she has written numerous 
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articles concerning the use of Read Only Memory. Her 
expertise is in the areas of software engineering and 
computer systems design with the emphasis on microcomputer 
techno Iogy. 
In a telephone conversation with Ms. Oqdin, she indi¬ 
cated that from a hardware standpoint, she could see no 
reason why the firmware approach to security could not be 
done. The technology presently exists and could be 
adapted for this purpose. She did see a potential 
problem area in that PROMs and EPROMs do have known fail¬ 
ure rates which could be bothersome once the firmware has 
been burned. 
Ms. Ogdin also believed that the use of firmware 
could lead to a false sense of security if it is relied 
upon too heavily. She felt that other security tech¬ 
niques will still be necessary and it would be desirable 
to audit the firmware periodically just to make sure that 
it is performing reliably. 
John C. O’Mara. Mr. O’Mara is Executive Director of the 
Computer Security Institute, an organization concerned 
with presenting and publishing seminars relating to 
computer security. He was suggested as a person to 
contact by Brandt Allen who serves on the advisory board 
of the institute. 
Mr. O’Mara was very positive to the firmware model 
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and felt that it had great potential for the future. He 
felt that it is a logical approach to place programs 
under the protection of physical access controls. When 
asked about the number of changes to software causing 
difficulty to successful implementation, Mr. O’Mara felt 
that this should not be a drawback. The firmware model 
will simply require systems designers to do more thinking 
in the design phase when they realize that changes would 
not be as easy at a later time. 
Mr. O’Mara Is encouraged by the capabilities of 
auditors to audit for fraud and feels that it Is 
justifiable to expect them to do the software audits. 
He fears however, that the training programs for good 
EDP auditors are not keeping pace with the demand for them 
and it may be quite some time before they can catch up. 
In conclusion, Mr. O’Mara could not find anything 
negative about the firmware model. He believed it is 
a cost effective means for providing security for all 
types of software, not just the computer accounting system. 
Donn B. Parker. Mr. Parker is the Manager of Computer 
Security Programs at SRI International, a consulting and 
research organization. Mr. Parker has written numerous 
articles and books relating to computer crime and is 
often considered the foremost expert In the field. 
Since Mr. Parker resides In California, it was 
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Impossible to talk with him personally but he was kind 
enough to write some of his opinions on the firmware 
model. He pointed out that the methods of mathematically 
proving algorithms has not advanced to the degree where 
accounting systems can be ’’proven" correct. The present 
methods of software review can only allow for placing a 
little more faith In the propriety of programs. 
Mr. Parker also pointed out that he has had difficulty 
in convincing people to lock up cabinet doors, that they 
are more concerned with fire and immediate access needs. 
This presents a problem with the firmware model which 
relies heavily upon adequate physical access controls. 
Mr. Parker believed that the firmware model can be 
very effective as it forces potential perpetrators to 
perform "formidable physical acts and electronic manipula¬ 
tions" which reduces the population of potential per¬ 
petrators. Since security is aimed at reducing the 
number of people in positions of trust, the firmware 
model, with its extra layer of protection, should limit 
the number of potential penetrators further than controls 
currently available. 
Frederic G. With? nqton . Mr. Withlngton is the author of 
several books and articles dealing with computers in 
business and computer technology. He is frequently quoted 
as an expert in the computer field and is presently 
working at Arthur D. Little, Inc. 
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Mr. Withington responded to the working paper by 
letter in which he noted only one problem with the firm¬ 
ware model. He felt that it would be necessary to place 
the systems programs, such as the operating system and 
data base management system, in firmware along with 
the accounting system as the accounting system programs 
rely heavily on these systems programs to access disk 
files. He felt that this was entirely possible and 
saw no other reason why the model was not workable. 
Discussion of the Interviews 
The interviewing process was rather successful from 
the standpoint of raising various issues which might 
detract from the applicability of the firmware model for 
accounting systems. A common problem with the process 
however, was that the interviewees were raising questions 
based on the working paper which was too short to adequately 
explain all the intricacies of the model. The purpose 
in presenting such a short paper was the expectation that 
a more complete explanation would be so long that it 
may have discouraged the interviewees from reading it. 
Interviewing based on the short paper meant that the inter¬ 
viewees frequently raised questions which had solutions 
already devised in the complete model. These solutions 
were presented during the interview and only those questions 
which remained unresolved to the satisfaction of the 
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interviewee have been described in the previous section. 
This section presents possible solutions to problems 
concerned with the implementation of the model which were 
not completely answered during the interview process. 
The most common problem identified through the 
interviews concerned the number of changes (maintenance 
and enhancements) which occur to programs after development 
work is completed. The pessimistic view, as expressed by 
Mr. Allen, was that programs are altered every week. While 
other interviewees did not feel that changes were that common, 
they felt that changes were freauent enough to cause 
problems if the firmware had to be refabricated with each 
change. They cited the additional auditing that would 
be required and the cost in time and money as the primary 
drawbacks. 
The problem faced by this researcher was that it 
appears that no statistics have ever been gathered on the 
frequency of changes and to the types of programs that 
changes are most common. The people interveiwed based 
their objections on "gut" feelings but could not provide 
any measurement of how serious the problem might be. 
The closest attempt to gather some information occurred 
when, during our interview, Mr. Allen received a cal' 
from the Chief Internal Auditor at the rederai Reserve 
Bank in Virginia. Mr. Allen asked him how many of the pro¬ 
grams there could be restricted to changes only once 
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per year and the reply was 50 to 60 percent. When 
Mr. Allen relaxed the restriction to once per quarter 
the auditor said 75 to 85 percent might fit in this 
category. The auditor stated that for his most critical 
programs he would require that the changes be made on 
an "as needed” basis because the Federal Reserve app¬ 
lications are so important that If money was not corr¬ 
ectly transferred each night, some banks may not be able 
to open in the morning! While these statistics are use¬ 
ful, they may be extreme because of the critical nature 
of the operation. 
While further research is clearly called for to 
determine the exact nature of program changes, it Is the 
* 
opinion of this researcher that the problem may not be as 
severe as indicated by the interviews. First, In most 
firms the computer accounting system is not the primary 
product as is the case with the banking or insurance in¬ 
dustries. It Is anticipated that firms which use the 
computer accounting system as a support function are less 
likely to require Immediate changes and would be more tol¬ 
erant of longer delays between changes. 
Secondly, it is this researcher’s contention that a 
majority of program changes occur to report generating 
programs and not to those applications which alter "‘■he 
data base. Since the firmware model does not place r0P^r+ 
generators In firmware, ease of alteration is retained *or 
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these programs. Only those programs which directly affect 
the data base will be more difficult to change. Although 
no substantial statistics can be presented, conversations 
with a software vendor providing accounting systems 
indicated that changes to their packages rarely occur once 
2 
they are installed. The vendors contend that 95 percent 
of their customers do not alter the system themselves 
but place requests for changes with the vendor and wait 
until an update is issued for the system. With a trend 
toward more purchased accounting software, it might In¬ 
dicate that fewer changes to accounting systems will be 
occurring in the future. 
A third point is that there Is probably a trend toward 
increased batching of changes at longer time intervals. 
Several of the interviewees agreed that this trend would 
encourage the use of firmware because changes would be 
less frequent. 
While the firmware model may be limited In use be¬ 
cause of changes to software, further research Is clearly 
called for to determine the extent of the limitation and 
under what circumstances these limitations would not be 
a factor. 
The second most commonly Identified problem with the 
firmware model was with respect to the amount of Interaction 
which must occur between the firmware locations and the 
operating system. This is not anticipated to be too major 
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a problem. As mentioned in Chapter IV, when a program 
In firmware requests a data transfer, such as writing on 
the protected unit. It will place the data on the protected 
data bus and then notify the operating system where the 
data Is to be written. It would then be the responsibility 
of the operating system to notify the channel controller 
to complete the transfer. This may require that a little 
more of the operation be handled by the channel controller, 
such as buffering, but since the protected units are ex¬ 
pected to have their own dedicated channel, this should 
not be difficult. An alternative solution presented by 
both Anderson and Withington was to place the operating 
system in firmware. This might overcome many of the 
problems but may not be a total solution. While either 
of these solutions are sure to have other, unanticipated 
problems, it is not the purpose of exploratory research 
such as this, to solve all problems, only to present 
major solutions and to leave the detailed problems for 
further research. 
Another problem identified through the interview 
process concerned the ability of auditors to do a sufficient 
audit before the programs are burned into firmware. Allen, 
GelIman, and Parker alI felt that auditors could not do 
an adequate test of the software to insure that fraudulent 
code did not exist. They felt that even if program proving 
techniques did exist, auditors would be unwi I I ing to corrmi t 
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themselves on the correctness of the software because 
they might leave themselves liable if they failed to detect 
illicit routines. This attitude was refuted by Mr. Adams 
who felt that while we cannot ’’prove” programs correct, 
adequate tools are available which allow auditors to 
certify programs with an acceptable level of risk. If 
auditors are required to do software audits for fraud, 
they would do so but the cost is going to be very high. 
This researcher tends to agree with Mr. Adams as any 
security or auditing technique must accept the risk of being 
in error. The key is to balance the liability incurred 
with being wrong with the additional cost of being 
absolutely right. While the cost of such audits is surely 
to be expensive, the trend toward more purchased software 
may ease the burden. If the software released by a vendor 
was to arrive in a pre-audited state, possibly already 
burned in firmware, the cost of the audit could be spread 
between all customers purchasing the product. By not having 
multiple audits of the same program, a more thorough 
audit could be conducted at a lower cost per installation. 
Ms. Ogdin felt that the failure rates of PROM and 
EPROM might prove to be a problem. This may be an over¬ 
statement since tests have found them to be extremely 
3 
reliable. The problems that do appear tend to be vendor 
and production lot oriented and it is therefore, 
suggested that testing of the firmware be conducted on a 
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4 
lot sampling basis. As the technology improves over time, 
this problem should become trivial. 
A problem identified by Mr. Anderson was that by 
installing firmware in the mainframe, memory addresses 
would become unavailable for more general usage. This may 
become a problem if a considerable amount of software 
is placed in firmware, especially since memory overlays 
would not be possible. He suggested the use of a switch 
which could deactivate the firmware locations and reassign 
them to RAM as a method to overcome this problem. While 
this is a possible solution, the problem may not be that 
significant since computer address word sizes usually 
allow for addressing more memory than is used. Provided 
that only important software is installed as firmware, 
it may be possible to use those previously unused 
addresses. 
An upsetting comment by Mr.Courtney was that there 
was no problem with the types of fraud the firmware model 
seeks to combat. This was based on Mr. Courtney’s impress¬ 
ion of customer needs but ignores the studies done by 
Allen and Parker. While the Allen and Parker data is 
admittedly biased because it is based on only known 
cases, the direction and extent of the bias is unknown. 
Since research must rely on other research if it is not to 
dupIicate efforts, the Allen and Parker data must be 
relied upon as providing the most comprehensive Infor- 
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matlon on computer fraud. Since Mr. Courtney could not 
provide any statistics to the contrary, this researcher 
believes that the use of published data is justified. 
The preceeding problems are ones which criticize the 
firmware model because of implementation difficulties and 
the need for such a technique. There still remains the 
issue of methods by which the model can be circumvented 
upon implementation. Some of these methods were raised 
during the interview process and others were anticipated 
during model development. It is to these problems we now 
turn . 
Circumventing the Firmware Model 
No security system can be so encompassing to 
claim that it can prevent all penetrations. Each sys¬ 
tem seeks to make the intrusion costs higher than the 
benefits received by the intrusion. The firmware model 
seeks to place an additional layer of protection on top 
of existing security systems to raise the intrusion costs 
even higher. In many cases, circumventing the firmware 
system still requires the penetrator to break existing 
software and administrative controls. Other intrusions 
are not really circumventing the firmware model but are 
weak points which exist in current control systems. Still, 
the possibility, no matter how remote, will exist for 
fraudulent access to the accounting data base. 
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One circumvention technique identified by Mr. Gellman 
is to alter the off-site backup copy of the data base 
and then to force use of this backup by destroying the 
on-site copies. This is entirely possible but is highly 
unlikely as it would require the perpetrator to not only 
have access to these backup copies and a method by which 
to change them, but also to be able to destroy the on-site 
copies. This method Is not a serious concern to the firm¬ 
ware model as it is a technique which Is possible even 
with existing security systems and is not one which the 
firmware model seeks to protect. 
Another possible method, identified by Mr. Adams, 
would be to rewire the hardware so as to disable the 
write-protect mechanism, thereby allowing programs in 
RAM to access the data base. It was suggested in Chapter 
IV that the write-protect mechanism be installed in the 
locked and sealed box with the firmware as a possible 
method to assist in preventing this type of penetration. 
However, it may still be possible to rewire around the 
entire box to circumvent even this control. This type 
of penetration Is unlikely as the penetrator must have 
access to the hardware for prolonged periods of time in 
order to incorporate the changes to the hardware. The 
firmware model assumes strict access control to the 
hardware which would greatly limit the number of persons 
who might have the opportunity to do this. Still, an 
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unscrupulous "Customer Engineer (CE)" would have this 
opportunity and so further protection is required. A 
possible solution may be to write a test program which, 
when run In RAM, would attempt to write on the protected 
unit. This could be run as one of the normal, daily 
test routines and should be used after any machine main¬ 
tenance. If the security system failed to detect the 
violation by this program, the test routine could notify 
the security officer for appropriate action. While not 
foolproof, it would provide an additional layer of pro¬ 
tection against an already unlikely occurrance. 
Mr. Allen felt that another circumvention technique 
would be to move the protected disk pack to an unprotected 
unit so, as In the rewiring technique, programs in RAM 
could access the data base. The main protection here is 
again the need for physical access to the hardware. This 
would not prevent an unscrupulous operator from doing such, 
however. A possible solution to this problem would be 
to use nonremovable disk packs but this would not be 
satisfactory as the need for backup for the protected 
unit would call for removable packs. A more reasonable 
solution Is to have the operating system detect disk 
unit power-downs and to notify the security system of the 
act for logging. Since it is necessary to power-down the 
unit to remove the disk, the security officer would be 
notified of the possible security breach when he reviews 
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the security log. It would then be his responsibility 
to find the reason for the power-down and to where the 
disk was moved. Using the system log, he could then 
do a detailed review to determine what kind of access 
was gained to the disk. This situation of disk unit power¬ 
downs should be infrequent and as such the detailed 
review of the log should not be called upon often. This 
log review is an additional layer of protection because 
while the disk Is on an unprotected unit it should still 
fall under the protection of the software security system 
which will be checking for access authorizations. 
While the preceeding circumvention techniques arise 
because of determined penetration attempts, there are other 
times when the firmware model will not be presenting its 
full protection capability. These would occur primarily 
when backtrp procedures are required. If the protected 
disk unit were to fail for some reason, the disk pack might 
have to be moved to an unprotected unit. This would falI 
in the same class of situations of the unscrupulous 
operator moving the disk, and would be given the same 
protection. The problem of removable disks may be solved 
in the future when bubble memories replace disks and are 
Installed as part of the hardware along with the 
firmware. Since bubble memories do not have any moving 
parts, their failure rates should be virtually zero. 
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Another time when the data base will not be secure 
is if the whole computer center is destroyed and operations 
must rely on the use of a backup center. In this situation 
there would not be any firmware nor write-protect mech¬ 
anism. If this does occur, security will probably 
not be a prime issue as the firm will be glad to have 
any computing facilities at all. Reliance must be placed 
on the software security system of the backup computer. 
Mr. Gulltinan feels that this risk presently is, and 
probably always will be, acceptable. 
Still another problem area occurs when errors are 
discovered in firmware programs which require immediate 
rectification. It is the opinion of this researcher that 
this problem should be very rare as the extensive auditing 
of the software should have discovered nearly all problems. 
In addition, it is likely that many of these "immediate" 
problems are notso serious to require Immediate solutions. 
However, if such should be the case, the corrections could 
occur to software stored versions of the programs which 
would then be run In RAM. This would require that the 
data base be moved to an unprotected unit so the program 
in RAM could access it. This in turn, would create an 
activity on the security log which would come to the 
attention of the security officer. It would then be his 
responsibility to review the need for the action and what 
correction took place. This would imply that the compilation 
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listings and the system log are saved for review by the 
security officer and possibly a committee set up for this 
purpose 
Cone I usions 
The interview process identified many new problems 
with the firmware model as had been expected with this 
type of exploratory research. While some solutions are 
simple to implement, others will require further research 
to determine the extent of the problem before adequate 
solutions can be devised. 
The major difficulties appear to be with the number 
of changes which occur to software and to how the inter¬ 
actions between the operating system and firmware can be 
handled. Future studies beyond this dissertation are called 
for in these areas. Other problem areas were identified 
and possible solutions have been presented. 
While there are methods by which the firmware model 
can be circumvented, control through physical access 
and the software security system usually provide the next 
layer of protection. Where possible, additional operational 
controls have been suggested to further strengthen over- 
a I I security. 
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CHAPTER V I 
CONCLUSIONS 
I ntroductIon 
The purpose of this study was to attempt to devise 
a method by which computer accounting systems could be 
protected against fraud resulting from alterations to 
computer accounting programs or to the accounting data base 
directly. A method was proposed by which the accounting 
programs would be fully audited and then Installed in the 
computer hardware as firmware, so as to require physical 
access to the computer in order to incorporate changes. 
It was expected that this physical access requirement 
would provide greater security than is possible through 
software means because physical access controls are more 
fully developed and can identify penetrators more readily. 
Since the firmware would become part of the computer 
hardware, it was proposed that it would be possible to 
rewire the machinery to allow only those programs in¬ 
stalled as firmware to affect changes to segregated 
disk units. If the accounting data base were placed on 
these segregated units, it was reasoned that only the 
audited accounting programs in firmware would have the 
capability to change the accounting data. 
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Summa ry 
The research was conducted as an exploratory study 
Into the viability of using firmware for security pur¬ 
poses. The first chapter defined the problem and the 
I 
method by which the research was conducted. A normative 
approach was taken as to build a working model would 
have been too expensive in both money and time. This 
type of research meant that the model had to be devel¬ 
oped in a logical manner and that some attempt had to 
be made to give credence to Its feasibility. The 
approach taken was to create the model to Its fullest 
development and then to present it to interested persons 
to gain their opinions on the use of the model. 
The second chapter reviewed the literature in the 
areas of computer fraud, computer security, and computer 
auditing to give the reader an Introduction to these 
subjects as the firmware model was to have an influence 
in each of these fields. While the material is not complete, 
it does present an overview of relevant topics In the areas. 
The third chapter presented a technical discussion 
of the electronics which would be necessary for programs 
to be installed as firmware. It attempted to present 
the new technology In relation to more common equipment 
to aid those readers who may not be familiar with the 
new developments in the computer industry. The operating 
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characteristics and programming techniques were explained 
and the equipment for programming PROMs was presented. 
The objective of the research was presented in the 
fourth chapter and was defined: 
To eliminate the probability of unauthorized 
changes to production programs which affect 
the accounting data base, and to insure that 
only audited, authorized programs have the 
ability to affect the accounting data base 
given that the accounting system is main¬ 
tained in a computer environment. 
The chapter then explained how the use of Read Only 
Memory (ROM), often called firmware, can be utilized 
to store the accounting system programs, allowing changes 
to those programs only with physical access to the computer 
hardware. It was reasoned that since physical access con¬ 
trols are well known and highly developed, that greater 
security would be provided to the accounting programs. 
It had been shown in the research explained in Chapter 
II that software security systems are not infallable and can 
be rather easily broken by determined penetrators. Since 
most firms already have physical access controls which 
would Identify all persons having access to the computer 
hardware, the possibility of unauthorized changes to 
firmware stored programs was greatly reduced. 
An additional layer of protection for the firmware 
was proposed to secure it against those who have 
legitimate access to the computer room. By placing the 
firmware In a locked and sealed box it would be possible 
169 
to deter access to the firmware even further and would 
identify if unauthorized access had been gained. 
Since the firmware was to become part of the main¬ 
frame hardware, it was possible to present a method by 
which only the programs in firmware would be given 
access to change files on given disk units. This write- 
protect mechanism would prevent other programs running 
on the computer from altering the accounting data base 
thereby discouraging fraud which results from access 
directly to the stored data. 
The fourth chapter also explained the changes which 
would be necessary to the hardware and software as a result 
of the firmware model. Solutions to problems encountered 
because of these changes were proposed. 
The remainder of Chapter IV explained a procedure 
by which accounting programs would be developed, audited, 
and then burned as firmware. The steps of the procedure 
and the auditing techniques were outlined in an attempt 
to show that the firmware model is operationally feasible 
given that the hardware is available. 
The fifth chapter contains the results of the inter¬ 
viewing process during which the firmware model was pre¬ 
sented to people in the areas of computer fraud, computer 
security, computer auditing, and computer hardware design. 
Through the interviewing process, many problems surfaced 
concerning the feasibility of the model with respect to 
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computer accounting systems. The major problem areas appear 
to be with respect to the number of changes which occur 
to accounting programs, the amount of interaction between 
the operating system and firmware, and the ability of 
auditors to audit for fraud. Solutions and counter¬ 
arguments to these and other problems were presented and 
while some have been satisfactorily answered, it appears 
that further research may be necessary. 
It appears from this exploratory study that the 
firmware model is a viable method for computer security. 
The technology is presently available and can be adapted 
for this purpose. The equipment is inexpensive and with 
prices dropping as rapidly as they have in the past, it 
is likely to become even more cost justifiable. However, 
the model may not be as applicable as had first been 
anticipated. The main difficulty rests with the exten¬ 
sive audit and production processes which must take place 
anytime a change is made to the accounting programs. 
If a firm encounters many changes to their software, the 
firmware approach may be too expensive. It appears that the 
model would be most useful in those situations in which 
changes are not common, such as turn-key operations or where 
the accounting software is purchased. 
Limitations of the Study 
The very nature of exploratory research dictates 
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that it will not fully cover all aspects of the topic, 
but wi I I attempt to gain some insight that the research 
is progressing in the right direction. It was expected 
that many questions would remain unanswered and will 
require further, more detailed study. There are several 
problems with this type of research, however, and these 
are outlined below. 
A major problem with normative research is that 
nothing is ever "proven” as to the applicability of the 
model. No attempt has been made to manipulate an inde¬ 
pendent variable to determine the effects on a dependent 
variable. Instead, an attempt was made to logically 
explain the nature of the model and to leave a more 
formal "proof" to that time when an actual working model 
can be developed. Only then will it be possible to 
determine the effectiveness of the security technique 
with more experimental manipulations. 
Another limitation arises from the use of interviews 
to determine the weak points in the model. Interviewees 
may have given more or less thought to the use of the 
model prior to their responses. As such, many problem 
areas are IikeIy to have been overlooked. New problems 
are likely to be discovered when a working model is 
d eve loped. 
The model assumes that many of the problems inden- 
tified will be easy to resolve. This may be a very large 
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assumption, especially with respect to software altera¬ 
tions, as experience In the computer industry indicates 
that many problems which appear to be easy to solve Ini¬ 
tially, turn out to be very difficult and expensive in the 
end . 
The model also assumes that the computer installa¬ 
tions where the firmware is installed will have adequate 
physical access controls. Mr. Parker indicated that 
he often has difficulty In getting people to lock up 
cabinet doors, that they are more concerned with immediate 
access needs. It has been this researcher’s experience in 
university settings, that physical access controls are very 
lax, even to the hardware used for university administrative 
purposes. It can only be hoped that better controls are 
used in those Installations which would be concerned enough 
to implement the firmware model. 
The use of the computer accounting system as an 
example of the use of firmware may not be genera I izabIe 
to other types of systems. The use of firmware for 
operating systems and data base management systems may 
be very different as they may not be as volatile nor 
require the extensive audits prior to being burned into 
firmware. 
Further Research 
This study was very effective in determining areas 
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for further research Into the use of the firmware model. 
The most obvious area would be with respect to the fre¬ 
quency and nature of changes to software. There appears 
to be no statistics available on how often changes occur 
and to the types of programs most frequently altered. 
It is expected by this researcher that the majority of 
program changes occur to report generating programs and 
not to those which affect the data base. If further 
research were to Indicate the opposite, the firmware 
model might become less feasible. Other research ques¬ 
tions which could be answered in conjunction with the 
nature of program changes, would concern the trends 
toward more batching of changes at longer time intervals 
and the use of more purchased accounting systems. If 
more purchased systems are being used, are there fewer 
changes to them then to those systems developed in-house? 
If the firmware model does appear to be a feasible 
solution to the fraud issue, it would only be reasonable 
to build a working model, possibly using a minicomputer. 
This working model Is bound to find problems which were 
not anticipated in this research. If a working model is 
developed, it would be possible to subject It to a 
"tiger team" penetration to determine its intrusion 
resistance. This would be the ultimate test of the use 
of firmware for security purposes. 
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Other areas where the firmware model could be more 
fully investigated would be with its use for compilers, 
operating systems, and other utility programs. These 
programs may prove to be more acceptable to the use 
of firmware because of fewer changes to them. 
The use of firmware with Data Base Management 
Systems (DBMSs), both on an interaction level and for 
the storage of the DBMS, provides another area worthy 
of research. Use of a DBMS may preclude the use of the 
write-protect mechanism as the DBMS would be handling 
all data transfers from both RAM and the firmware. Many 
difficulties are likely to arise from this type of data 
management. 
Final Comments 
This researcher holds great expectations for the 
use of firmware in future systems. Hammer predicts 
that, MThe future of the software industry will perhaps 
make the debacle of mechanical watches look like a Sunday 
School picnic. A multitude of firmware applications will 
Include not only compilers but also the management of 
hierarchical and relational data bases, as well as many 
common elements of current software, including computer 
I 
operating systems.” After ten months of research into 
the use of firmware, this researcher heartily agrees! 
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